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Damages: A Remedy for the
Violation of Constitutional Rights
Jean C. Lovet
One of the most significant developments in the field of civil rights
litigation has been the emergence of damages as a remedy for the en-
forcement of constitutional guarantees. In 1871, Congress created a
cause of action,' now codified in 42 U.S.C. section 1983,2 to redress the
violation of constitutional rights by persons acting under color of state
law. Subsequently, in a fitting centennial celebration of section 1983's
enactment, the United States Supreme Court, in Bivens v. Six Unknown
NamedAgents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,3 recognized a compara-
ble cause of action against federal officials implicit in the Constitution.4
The volume of section 1983 and Bivens litigation5 has steadily in-
creased during the last two decades.' Lower federal courts have al-
t Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California, Davis. B.A. 1965, J.D. 1968,
University of Wisconsin. I am grateful to my colleagues Ed Barrett, Emma Jones, and John
Poulos for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I am also indebted to my
research assistants Nancy Austin, Phil Kruger, and Janet Vining for their unceasing support.
1 . Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (violation of fourth amendment).
4. In Davis v. Passman, 99 S. Ct. 2264 (1979), the Court extended Bivens beyond the fourth
amendment by implying a cause of action and a damages remedy under the equal protection
component of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
5. Throughout this Article the terms "Bivens litigation" and "Bivens action" will be used
interchangeably to describe a private action against a federal official to redress a constitutional
violation. The word "Bivens" will be used to describe the case itself.
6. In 1960, 280 lawsuits were filed under § 1983. The annual total increased to 3,985 by
1970 and to 12,313 in 1977. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section
1983 Damage Remedyfor Law Enforcers'Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 452 (1978). A substantial
1242
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CONSTITUTIONAL DAMAGES
lowed plaintiffs to recover damages for a wide range of constitutional
violations, including racial discrimination in voting, employment, pub-
lic accommodations, and housing; interference with the first amend-
ment freedoms of speech and assembly; unreasonable searches and
seizures; and infringements of procedural and substantive due process.7
Not until 1978, however, did the Supreme Court hand down a decision
concerning the types of damages recoverable for an infringement of
constitutional rights. In Carey v. Piphus8 the Court ruled that while
presumed compensatory damages may not be awarded in a section
1983 action for a violation of procedural due process, nominal and
proven compensatory damages are appropriate to redress such a griev-
ance.
Although Carey signals the Court's concern over the appropriate
role for damages as a remedy in constitutional litigation, the opinion
expressly limits the Court's decision to procedural due process cases. 9
This Article addresses the functions of legal relief for constitutional vi-
olations and the kinds of damages that ought to be recoverable in sec-
tion 1983 and Bivens actions in the aftermath of the Carey decision. 10
Part I will discuss the range of damages recoverable in common law
tort actions. Part II will analyze Carey as a case study of a typical
constitutional tort action. Parts III and IV will discuss the various
problems raised by Carey concerning awards of compensatory and
nominal damages in constitutional litigation. Part V will consider the
efficacy of awarding punitive damages. Finally, Part VI will recom-
mend judicial or legislative recognition of presumed compensatory
percentage of these suits were filed by prisoners. Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Section
1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1979).
7. For a collection of illustrative cases decided under § 1983, see McCormack, Federalism
and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, 60 VA. L.
REV. 1, 54-66 (1974). For a comparable collection of lower federal court Bivens decisions, see
Lehmann, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of a Constitutional Cause ofActionfor Torts Commit-
ted by Government Officials, 4 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 531 (1977).
8. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
9. Id. at 265.
10. In contrast with the enormous volume of literature on other aspects of civil rights litiga-
tion, relatively few articles have dealt with the problems of fashioning damage awards in § 1983
and Bivens actions. See Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Indiidual Rights, 39 MINN.
L. REV. 493 (1955); Hagarty & Tynan, Evaluation of Damages in Civil Rights Litigation, 25 FED.
INS. COUNSEL Q. 149 (1975); Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLuM. L. REV. 1109 (1969); Mc-
Cormack, supra note 7, at 55-66; Nahmod, Section 1983 andthe 'ackground" of Tort Liability, 50IND. L.. 5, 25 n.89 (1974); Newman, supra note 6; Yudof, Liabilityfor Constitutional Torts and the
Risk-Averse Public School Official, 49 So. CAL. L. REv. 1322, 1366-83 (1976); Comment, Civil
Actionsfor Damages Under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 45 TEXAS L. REv. 1015 (1967). The
focus of this Article is on the types of damages recoverable in constitutional tort litigation, and not
on whether legal relief is an appropriate remedy. For a discussion of the latter topic, see Hill,
supra Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: ConstitutionalLegality and the Law of Torts in Bell v.
Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1968).
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damages in actions for violations of constitutional rights that protect
intangible, dignitary interests.
COMMON LAW DAMAGES
Since Congress has not specified the damages recoverable in sec-
tion 1983 and Bivens litigation,"' the courts have drawn upon the com-
mon law of damages to fashion remedies' 2 for deprivations of
constitutional rights.'3 The following sections provide a cursory over-
view of tort damages as a prelude to full consideration of Carey v.
P#?hus.
A. Compensatory Damages
Compensatory damages are awarded for the harm caused by the
defendant's violation of the plaintiff's legal rights.' 4 Such damages
may be special or general. Special damages are awarded for past, pecu-
niary losses arising out of circumstances peculiar to the plaintiff's case,
11. Section 1983 merely states that the defendant "shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). As for the Bivens action, the Court derived the right of
action against federal officials from the Constitution itself, and Congress has not legislated in the
area.
12. Section 1988 explicitly authorizes the use of common law remedies in § 1983 actions. 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), reproduced in relevant part at note 135 infra. Carey is the first Supreme
Court decision to articulate federal rules to govern the recovery of damages under § 1983. The
determination as a matter of federal law of the amount of nominal damages recoverable, 435 U.S.
at 267, marks a departure from lower court decisions that have applied state law on this question,
see, e.g., United States exrel. Tyrell v. Speaker, 535 F.2d 828, 830 n.13 (3d Cir. 1976). This aspect
of Carey will be welcomed by judges and commentators who have advocated a uniform law of
damages in constitutional tort actions. Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 86 (3d Cir. 1965); Bristow,
§ 1983: An Analysis and Suggested Approach, 29 ARK. L. RE. 255, 301 (1975); Nahmod, supra
note 10, at 9; Comment, supra note 10, at 1024-25. The decision will facilitate the development of
a consistent body of remedial law for all constitutional tort actions, since the rules developed
under § 1983 will usually be applied in Bivens actions. See, e.g., Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862
(3d Cir. 1975) (Bivens action in which court looks to § 1983 actions for guidance on damages).
In Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978), the Court, applying a state survival statute in
a § 1983 action, made it clear that sometimes the content of the federal remedial rule under § 1983
will be determined by state law. This "obviously means that there will not be nationwide uni-
formity on these issues." Id. at 593 n. 11. A comparison of Robertson and Carey suggests that the
Court may be more likely to apply state statutory law than state decisional law in formulating
§ 1983 remedies. Similarly, with respect to § 1983 defenses, the courts have developed a body of
federal, judge-made law to govern immunities, but often have looked to state law for the applica-
ble statute of limitations. Glennon, Constitutional Liberty and Property, Federal Common Law and
Section 1983, 51 So. CAL. L. REv. 355, 386-92 (1978) (citing the relevant cases). It is assumed in
this Article that the Court will continue to formulate a federal common law of constitutional tort
damages which will control the most substantial questions in both § 1983 and Bivens actions. For
the present, Bivens approves the use of the remedial mechanisms "normally available in the fed-
eral courts." 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
13. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
14. D. DOBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.1 (1973).
1244
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and are recoverable only upon proof of actual loss. 5 General dam-
ages, on the other hand, may be awarded for either pecuniary or non-
pecuniary losses, and provide compensation for harm that any plaintiff
can be expected to suffer as a result of the commission of the tort in
question.' 6
General damages for nonpecuniary losses may be proven or pre-
sumed. They are recoverable only upon proof of actual loss when the
sole nonpecuniary harm sustained by the plaintiff is harm to the per-
son, such as pain and suffering, mental and emotional distress, or hu-
miliation.17 In contrast, when the substantive cause of action is for
harm to other intangible interests, such as reputation, 8 voting rights, 9
liberty,20 and privacy,21 general damages are presumed, although the
scope of the presumption varies. In defamation actions, for example,
general damages are presumed for any type of loss that would normally
result from the publication of a defamatory statement.2 2 In privacy ac-
tions, on the other hand, general damages are presumed solely for
harm to the plaintiff's interest in privacy.23
The Supreme Court has recently recognized a conflict between
first amendment values and the protection of the plaintiff's reputation
through the remedy of presumed general damages. In Gertz v. Robert
15. Id. § 3.2; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 8 (1935); H. Mc-
GREGOR, DAMAGES 15-20 (13th ed. 1972).
16. The terms "special" and "general" damages have multiple meanings in the law of reme-
dies. In the pleading context, special damages are those that must be itemized in the complaint
(such as past medical expenses), whereas general damages require no specific allegations. H. Mc-
GREGOR, supra note 15, at 19-20. When the focus shifts to the trial of a case, special damages can
be measured precisely (such as pecuniary losses), while general damages cannot be assessed by
any measure other than the opinion and judgment of a reasonable person. Id. at 18. In actions
for property damage, general damages are awarded for the losses that "'generally' flow from the
kind of substantive wrong done by the defendant," and are typically measured by the difference
between the market value of the property before and after the commission of the tort. D. DOBBS,
supra note 14, § 3.2. Special damages, on the other hand, include items of loss "that are more or
less peculiar to the particular plaintiff." Id.
In defamation actions, special damages are compensation for actual, proven economic loss
resulting directly from the publication of a defamatory statement, and are a prerequisite to recov-
ery in actions for slander or libel per quod. Id. § 7.2. General damages, on the other hand, are
compensation for pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses presumed to result from the publication of a
defamatory statement Id. They may be awarded without proof of special damages in actions for
slander per se or libel per se, and in addition to special damages in actions for slander or libel per
quod. Id.
17. See H. McGREGOR, supra note 15, at 39-42, 1406-10.
18. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 15, § 116. Presumed general damages are also recoverable
in actions for malicious prosecution. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 4.7 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 670 (1977).
19. Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64 (1919).
20. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 107.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(H)(a) (1977).
22. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 116.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(H) (1977).
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Welch, Inc. ,24 the Court held that an award of presumed general dam-
ages against a media defendant in a defamation action is unconstitu-
tional, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. In lieu of presumed general
damages, the Court authorized the recovery of "compensation for ac-
tual injury."25 Gertz, of course, is confined to defamation actions, and
does not affect the validity of presumed general damages in other types
of common law tort actions.
The principal purpose of both special and general compensatory
damages is to put the plaintiff in the same position as the plaintiff
would have been but for the defendant's breach of a legal duty.26 By
placing the costs of breach on the wrongdoer, compensatory damages.
also perform a deterrence function.27  In addition, an award of pre-
sumed general damages enables a jury to vindicate the valuable intan-
gible rights of a plaintiff who has been unable to prove any actual
loss. 28
B. Nominal Damages
Nominal damages typically consist of a one dollar allocation
awarded upon proof that the defendant has violated the plaintiff's legal
rights.29 They are recoverable only in select actions, such as trespass to
land, battery, assault, false imprisonment, defamation, and malicious
prosecution.3" Since they are awarded for the purposes of declaring3'
24. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
The Court held presumed damages unconstitutional because "the largely uncontrolled discre-
tion of juries to award damages where there is no loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of
any system of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amend-
ment freedoms." Id. at 349.
25. The Court gave the following description of "actual injury":
We need not define "actual injury," as trial courts have wide experience in framing ap-
propriate jury instructions in tort actions. Suffice it to say that actual injury is not limited
to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by de-
famatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the community,
personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. Of course, juries must be lim-
ited by appropriate instructions, and all awards must be supported by competent evi-
dence concerning the injury, although there need be no evidence which assigns an actual
dollar value to the injury.
Id. at 350.
26. D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.1.
27. See generally G. CALEBRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
28. Young v. Gormley, 120 Iowa 372, 375, 94 N.W. 922, 924 (1903); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 901(d), Comment c (1979).
29. D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.8; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 907 (1979).
30. D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.8.
31. Id. Although this is also a function of modem declaratory judgment statutes, they have
not displaced the nominal damages remedy. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(b), Com-
ment b (1979).
[V/ol. 67:12421246
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and vindicating32 legal rights, nominal damages do not require proof of
harm.
C. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are awarded in addition to compensatory or
nominal damages.33 Proof of a highly culpable state of mind is neces-
sary to support an award of punitive damages34 and the amount of the
award is dependent upon the defendant's financial circumstances.
Punitive damages primarily serve penal and deterrent functions.36 In
addition, when punitive damages are awarded in conjunction with gen-
eral compensatory or nominal damages, they also perform a vindica-
tory function. 37  Finally, insofar as punitive damages provide an
incentive for an aggrieved citizen to act as a private attorney general,
they perform a law enforcement or "bounty" function.
38
II
CA EY v PIPHUS: A CASE STUDY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
TORT ACTION
A. Carey v. Piphus
During the 1973-1974 academic year, two students were suspended
from a Chicago, Illinois public school without a hearing.39 Jarius
Piphus was suspended for twenty days for violating a rule that prohib-
ited students from smoking marijuana on school property.40 Silas Bris-
coe was suspended for twenty days for violating a rule that prohibited
male students from wearing earrings to class a.4  Both boys brought ac-
tions against the school officials under section 1983, alleging a violation
of procedural due process4 2 and seeking declaratory and injunctive re-
lief and damages.43 Piphus was readmitted within eight days pursuant
to a temporary restraining order.' Briscoe was voluntarily readmitted
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(d) (1979).
33. D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.9; C. McCoRMICK, supra note 15, § 77.
34. D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.9; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 81.
35. D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.9.
36. Id.; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 77.
37. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 15, § 23; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(d), Com-
ment c (1979).
38. D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.9; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 77.
39. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
40. Id. at 249.
41. Id. at 250.
42. Jarius Piphus was never given an opportunity to prove that he had not been smoking
marijuana. Id. at 249. Silas Briscoe was never allowed to offer evidence that his earring did not
denote gang membership, but rather was a symbol of black pride. Id. at 250.
43. Id. at 250-51.
44. Id. at 250.
1979]
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after seventeen days while a motion for a preliminary injunction was
still pending in federal district court.45
The two cases were then consolidated and submitted for final ad-
judication on stipulated records. 46 The district court held that both stu-
dents had been suspended without procedural due process.4 7 Although
the court stated that the students were entitled to declaratory relief and
to have the suspensions expunged from their school records, it failed to
enter an order to that effect.48 In considering the prayer for damages,
the court held that the defendants could not successfully assert the de-
fense of official immunity,49 but nevertheless declined to award dam-
ages because "[pilaintiffs put no evidence in the record to quantify their
damages and the record is completely devoid of any evidence which
could even form the basis of a speculative inference measuring the ex-
tent of their injuries."50
On plaintiffs' appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed and remanded.51 It ruled that declaratory and injunctive re-
lief should have been granted, even though the defendants represented
that all reference to the invalid suspensions had been expunged from
the plaintiffs' records.52 The court found that the question of damages
was controlled by one of its past decisions53 in which it had distin-
guished two types of "nonpunitive" damages recoverable in civil rights
cases: "[T]he nonpunitive damages to be awarded may be special, in
the sense that they are related to the particular mental distress or other
injury to the plaintiff, and general, in the sense that damages are inher-
ent in the nature of the wrong."5 4 The court of appeals concluded that
the plaintiffs were entitled to recover nonpunitive damages,55 and re-
manded the case to determine whether the suspensions had been for a
just cause.56 If they had been, the plaintiffs would be limited to general
damages "for the injury which is 'inherent in the nature of the wrong' "
caused by a denial of due process.5 If the suspensions had not been for
45. Ad. at 251.
46. Id.
47. Piphus v. Carey, Nos. 73-C 2522 and 74-C 303 Consol. (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd, 545 F.2d
30 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
48. Piphus v. Carey, Nos. 73-C 2522 and 74-C 303 Consol. at A13-14.
49. Id. at A14. For a discussion of public official immunity, see text accompanying notes 85-
100 infra.
50. Id.
51. Piphus v. Carey, 545 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
52. 545 F.2d at 31.
53. Id. (citing Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976)).
54. Hostrop v. Board of Juior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d at 580.
55. 545 F.2d at 31.
56. Id. at 32.
57. Id. at 31.
[Vol. 67:12421248
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a just cause, the plaintiffs would be entitled to general damages and
special or consequential damages for the harm resulting from the sus-
pensions. 58 The court indicated that general damages would be recov-
erable without proof of individualized injury, such as pecuniary loss or
mental distress. Instead, the trial court was instructed to fix an amount
"neither so small as to trivialize the right nor so large as to provide a
windfall. 5
9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
"whether, in an action under section 1983 for the deprivation of proce-
dural due process, a plaintiff must prove that he actually was injured by
the deprivation before he may recover substantial 'nonpunitive' dam-
ages. ' 60 The Court held that such proof is a prerequisite to recovery in
an action for the denial of procedural due process.61 Whether pre-
sumed general damages would be recoverable to redress the violation
of other constitutional guarantees, 62 however, remained unresolved.
Although the Court declined to affirm the Seventh Circuit's gen-
eral damages award, it did acknowledge "the importance to organized
society that procedural due process be observed. ' 63 Consequently, the
Court held that nominal damages should be awarded to vindicate any
deprivation of this "absolute" rightf' Furthermore, the Court inti-
mated that punitive damages might be permitted "in a proper case
under section 1983 with the specific purpose of deterring or punishing
violations of constitutional rights."' 65  Such damages could not be
awarded to Piphus and Briscoe, however, in view of the trial court's
finding that the defendants had not acted "with a malicious intention to
deprive [plaintiffs] of their rights or to do them other injury. '66
B. Constitutional Tort Actions
This section provides an overview of the prima facie case, de-
fenses, and remedies applied in constitutional tort actions generally,
with an emphasis on Carey v. Piphus in particular. It is designed to
clarify the scope and content of section 1983 and Bivens litigation.
Readers familiar with these actions may turn to Part III.
58. Id. at 32.
59. Id. at 31-32.
60. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 253.
61. Id. at 264.
62. Id. at 265.
63. Id. at 264.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 257 n.11.
66. Id.
12491979]
HeinOnline  -- 67 Cal. L. Rev. 1249 1979
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
I Plaintff's Case
There are two types of constitutional tort actions. Section 1983
creates a statutory cause of action against state or local officials. 7 In
contrast, a Bivens action is judicially created and directed against fed-
eral officials. 68 In Carey v. P#7hus, the plaintiffs brought suit under sec-
tion 1983 because the defendants were public school board members
and administrators.6 9  To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiffs
were compelled to prove (1) that the defendants acted under color of
state law as officers of a local governmental entity; (2) that the plaintiffs
had been deprived of the constitutional right to procedural due process;
and (3) that the defendants had either subjected the plaintiffs or caused
the plaintiffs to be subjected to the alleged deprivation.7 0 The statutory
language, which stipulates only these elements, suggests that Congress
intended to impose liability without further proof of fault. Yet, it has
been argued that section 1983 is a tort action requiring proof of culpa-
ble conduct.7' In Monroe v. Pape,72 the Supreme Court held that a
section 1983 plaintiff need not establish a "specific intent to deprive a
person of a federal right, ' 73 but the Court has not yet considered
whether a section 1983 plaintiff must prove some lesser degree of
fault.74
If a factual dispute similar to Carey v. P'phus were litigated under
Bivens, the threshold issue would be whether Bivens extends to proce-
dural due process violations.75 Although the Supreme Court has not
addressed the question directly, it has characterized Bivens as establish-
ing that "a citizen suffering a compensable injury to a constitutionally
protected interest [can] invoke the general federal question jurisdiction
67. For surveys of § 1983 actions, see Bristow, supra note 12; McCormack, supra note 7;
Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1133 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Developments].
68. For a survey of the Bivens cases, see Lemann, supra note 7.
69. 435 U.S. at 250-51 nn.2 & 4.
70. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 171, 187; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
71. For discussions of whether proof of fault is required under § 1983, see Kirkpatrick, De-
fining A Constitutional Tort Under Section 1983: The State-of-Mind Requirement, 46 U. CIN. L.
REv. 45 (1977); Nahmod, supra note 10, at 13-22; Developments, supra note 67, at 1204-17.
72. 365 U.S. at 187.
73. Id.
74. In Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978), the Court agreed to consider "[w]hether
negligent failure to mail certain of a prisoner's outgoing letters states a cause of action under
§ 1983," or whether proof of greater culpability is required. Id. at 559 n.6. But the Court evaded
the question by assuming that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case and holding that the
defendants were immune from suit because they had acted in good faith with respect to an unset-
tled area of constitutional law. Id. at 566 n.14. In Baker v. McCollan, 99 S. Ct. 2689 (1979), the
Court once again had an opportunity to decide "whether simple negligence can give rise to § 1983
liabilty," but found instead that the plaintiff had failed to prove a violation of the Constitution.
75. See Lehmann, supra note 7, at 566-72.
[Vol. 67:12421250
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of the district courts to obtain an award of monetary damages against
the responsible federal official."76 This language is sufficiently broad to
authorize an action for any constitutional violation, including an in-
fringement of procedural due process. In Davis v. Passman,7 7 the Court
recognized an implied cause of action and damages remedy for a viola-
tion of the equal protection component of the fifth amendment's due
process clause. The Davis Court identified several relevant considera-
tions in determining whether to imply a damages remedy for a viola-
tion of the Constitution, including whether (1) an explicit congressional
declaration barring the plaintiff's recovery of money damages from the
defendant is extant; (2) "special factors counselling hesitation" are ap-
parent; and (3) a damages remedy is appropriate.78 Thus, although the
question of whether Bivens extends to particular constitutional viola-
tions remains unresolved, Davis indicates that Bivens may be read ex-
pansively.
The prima facie case in a Bivens action remains relatively unde-
fined. In a line of lower federal court decisions, Bivens has been char-
acterized as the federal counterpart to section 1983.79 Thus, it is likely
that a plaintiff bringing a Bivens action will have to prove the depriva-
tion of a constitutional right by a defendant acting under color of fed-
eral authority. Moreover, it is probable that the same degree of
culpability will be required in Bivens as in section 1983 actions.8 0
2. Defenses
a. Immunities
The most common defenses to both section 1983 and Bivens ac-
tions are the immunities that can be asserted by public officials and
governmental entities.81 Public official immunity serves principally to
ensure that qualified persons will not be deterred from assuming poli-
76. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 486 (1978) (emphasis added).
77. 99 S. Ct. at 2264.
78. Id. at 2268.
79. See, e.g., Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d at 870. The cases are collected and cited with
approval in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 500.
80. See, e.g., Payne v. Government of Dist. of Columbia, 559 F.2d 809, 818-19 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
81. The law governing immunities has developed rapidly in recent years. Recent publica-
tions on the subject include C. RHYNE, W. RHYNE, & S. ELMENDORF, TORT LIABILITY AND IM-
MLNITY OF MUNICIPAL OFFIcIALs (1976); Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Offcer Tort
Liability, 77 COLUM. L. REy. 1175 (1977); Freed, Executive Official Immunityjor Constitutional
Violations: An.Analysis anda Critique, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 526 (1977); Kattan, Knocking on Wood.-
Some Thoughts on the Immunities of State Officials to Civil Rights Damage Actions, 30 VAND. L.
Ray. 941 (1977); Levin, The Section 1983 Municopallmmunity Doctrine, 65 GEo. L.J. 1483 (1977);
McCormack & Kirkpatrick, Immunities of State Officials Under Section 1983, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 65
(1976); Nahmod, Persons Who Are Not 'ersons" Absolute Individual Immunity Under Section
1983, 28 DE PAUL L. REv. 1 (1978); Theis, Offcial Immunity and the Civil Rights Act, 38 LA. L.
1979] 251
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cymaking public service positions by the prospect of personal liabil-
ity.82 Governmental or sovereign immunity is recognized largely to
protect the public fisc.8 3 Because the primary purpose of both types of
immunities is to prevent the imposition of pecuniary liability, they can
be invoked only in actions for retroactive monetary relief.
8 4
i Public OfficialImmuniy. Until recently, public officials subject
to section 1983 actions enjoyed complete immunity in the execution of
discretionary, policymaking functions.85 Consequently, plaintiffs were
restricted to obtaining judgments against those parties least likely to be
capable of satisfying them, such as low-level officials performing minis-
terial tasks.8 6 In 1974, however, the Supreme Court began to reexam-
ine the absolute immunity doctrine.8 7 In the aftermath of this
reexamination, legislators,88 judges, 9 and prosecutors9" continue to en-
joy absolute immunity, but executive officials at both the state9' and
federal9 2 levels are limited to a qualified immunity, regardless of rank
or function.
REv. 281 (1978); Developments, supra note 67, at 1190-1217; Symposium-ClvilLiabilily of Govern-
ment Officials, 17 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 1 (1978).
82. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239-40 (1974).
83. 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 18, § 29.3.
84. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314 n.6 (1975) ("immunity [of public officials] from
damages does not ordinarily bar equitable relief as well"); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)
.(eleventh amendment bars suit for accrued monetary liability); Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908) (eleventh amendment does not bar prospective injunctive relief). The Supreme Court has
not yet ruled on the difficult question of whether back pay is to be regarded as retroactive mone-
tary relief. Developments, supra note 67, at 1197-99 & n.58.
85. See generaly Lehmann, supra note 7, at 587-97; Developments, supra note 67, at 1191-
1204.
86. Dean Prosser described the ministerial-discretionary dichotomy as follows:
The courts have set up a finespun and more or less unworkable distinction between acts
which are regarded as "discretionary," or "quasi-judicial," in character, requiring per-
sonal deliberation, decision and judgment, and those which are merely "ministerial,"
amounting only to an obedience to orders, or to the performance of a duty in which the
officer is left no choice of his own.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 988-89 (4th ed. 1971).
87. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 232.
88. Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979); Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
89. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
90. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). Although one court has held that a prosecutor
is entitled to a qualified immunity while performing investigatory functions, Briggs v. Goodwin,
569 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978), the United States Supreme Court
in Imbler declined to rule on the immunity required "for those aspects of the prosecutor's respon-
sibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than that of
advocate." 424 U.S. at 430-31.
91. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563
(1975); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). One
court has questioned whether the qualified immunity should be extended to all executive person-
nel Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1, 11, 13-14 (1st Cir.) (remanded to determine whether social
workers entitled to immunity), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978).
92. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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A qualified immunity is a conditional defense93 that protects pub-
lic officials who have acted with a-reasonable belief that they have not
violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights.94 Its scope varies accord-
ing to the "discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the cir-
cumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on
which liability is sought to be based."95 A qualified immunity cannot
be invoked by officials who knew that they were violating the Constitu-
tion (subjective bad faith), or who should have known that they were
transgressing a clearly established constitutional rule (objective bad
faith).96
These principles were applied in a revealing fashion to the defen-
dants in Carey v. Piphus. The district court ruled that the defendants
had not acted in subjective bad faith because there was no evidence
that they had acted maliciously in enforcing their disciplinary policies
against the plaintiffs.97 However, the court found that the defendants
had demonstrated objective bad faith,98 since the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit had indicated in Linwood v. Board of Education99
that a lengthy suspension without an adjudicative hearing violates pro-
cedural due process. The district court found that the defendants
should have known that they were violating the plaintiff's constitu-
tional rights as determined by Linwood.10°
93. Although there is a division of opinion in the lower federal courts as to whether the
plaintiff or the defendant has the burden of proving entitlement to the immunity, the better view is
that the immunity is an affirmative defense as to which the defendant has the burden of proof.
See, eg., Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 1327 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978);
Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 538 F.2d 53, 61-62 (3rd Cir. 1976); Freed, supra note 81, at 562-63;
Kattan, supra note 81, at 986-89.
94. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 247-48.
95. Id. at 247. For two recent cases illustrating the application of this test, see Landrum v.
Moats, 576 F.2d at 1327 n.14, and Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 829-30, 832 n.32 (2d Cir.
1977).
96. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at 322. See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 506-07.
97. Piphus v. Carey, Nos. 73-C 2522 and 74-C 303 Consol. at A13 (N.D. IMI. 1975), rev'd, 545
F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
98. Piphus v. Carey, Nos. 73-C 2522 and 74-C 303 Consol. at A13-14.
99. 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1972) (upholding the constitutionality of a state statute which
authorized seven-day suspensions of students without a hearing), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027
(1972).
100. Piphus v. Carey, Nos. 73-C 2522 and 74-C 303 Consol. at A14. Actually, it may be
questioned whether the defendants "should have known that they were transgressing a clearly
established constitutional rule," which is the test set forth in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at 322
(emphasis supplied). At the time of the plaintiffs' suspensions the Supreme Court had not yet
decided Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), which held that procedural due process must be
accorded to students temporarily suspended from school. Carey did not address the issue, how-
ever, because the defendants chose not to challenge the district court's holding on appeal. Carey
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 251 n.6. For a discussion of the "settled law" test in Wood, see Kattan,
supra note 81, at 976-86; Yudof, supra note 10, at 1338-46.
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i Governmental Immunity. Since Monroe v. Pape'01 had estab-
lished that municipal corporations (and presumably other local govern-
ment entities) are not "persons" subject to suit under section 1983,102
the plaintiffs in Carey v. P#phus did not join the school district as a
defendant. But in the recent decision of Monell v. Department of Social
Services, °3 the Supreme Court reconsidered the relevant legislative
history." The Court concluded that Congress had intended section
1983 to apply to municipalities and other local governmental units
when (1) "the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements
or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision offi-
cially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers;"' 0 5 or (2) the
constitutional deprivation "[has been] visited pursuant to governmental
'custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval
through the body's official decisionmaking channels."0 6 If Monell had
been applicable to the Carey case, the plaintiffs could have sued the
school district because they were suspended pursuant to a school board
rule authorizing the temporary removal of students for a period not
exceeding one month without a hearing. 0 7
Under Monell, local governmental units continue to enjoy a cer-
tain measure of protection from section 1983 actions. First, the Court
held that section 1983 does not authorize the imposition of vicarious
liability against a governmental entity. 08 Thus, while a municipal
body may incur liability for an official policy sanctioning the commis-
sion of a constitutional tort, the existence of an employer-employee re-
lationship with an official who is responsible for a constitutional
violation is an insufficient premise for governmental liability. Second,
the Court indicated that it might be willing to recognize a qualified
immunity for local governmental entities. 0 9 However, since the parties
101. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
102. Id. at 187-92.
103. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). For a discussion of the impact of Monell, see Schnapper, Civil
Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (1979).
104. 436 U.S. at 664-89.
105. Id. at 690.
106. Id. at 690-91. The Court provided few guidelines as to what constitutes an "official
policy or custom." Id. at 713 (Powell, J., concurring); Molina v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846, 855
(9th Cir. 1978) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048 (1979).
107. Piphus v. Carey, Nos. 73-C 2522 and 74-C 303 Consol. at A9.
108. 436 U.S. at 691.
109. Id. at 701. The question of whether a qualified immunity should be extended to local
governmental bodies is pending before the Court. Owen v. City of Independence, 589 F.2d 335
(8th Cir.), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3189 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1979). At least one lower court has recog-
nized such an immunity for municipalities. Ohland v. City of Montpelier, 467 F. Supp. 324 (D.
Vt. 1979). Contra, Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449 (1979). It still may be
possible to bring a vicarious liability action against a municipality by suing under Bivens for a
fourteenth amendment violation. See, e.g., Molina v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1978)
(refusing to allow recovery against city), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048 (1979).
1254 Vol. 67:1242
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in Monell had not briefed the question, the Court expressed no views
on the matter. 1 0
States might also have been subject to a suit for damages under
section 1983. Congress has the power under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment to override the eleventh amendment and subject the states
to liability for retroactive monetary relief."' However, the Supreme
Court concluded in a recent decision that Congress did not intend to
exercise that power when it enacted section 1983.112 The states there-
fore enjoy absolute immunity from liability for damages in section
1983 actions.
An entirely different set of criteria governs the liability of the
United States for the unconstitutional conduct of a federal agent. As a
general proposition, the United States enjoys sovereign immunity.13
The Federal Tort Claims Act, 14 however, waives governmental immu-
nity in actions for money damages "caused by the negligent or wrong-
ful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment.""' Thus, in contrast to
section 1983, which was construed in Monell to impose only direct lia-
bility on governmental entities," 6 the Federal Tort Claims Act makes
the United States vicariously liable for the acts of its employees. 117 The
Act contains numerous exceptions to the general rule of vicarious lia-
bility, including section 2680(h), which in its original form immunized
110. 436 U.S. at 701. The Court refused to recognize an absolute immunity for municipal
bodies. Id.
111. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 702 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring). As a general propo-
sition, the eleventh amendment immunizes states from liability for monetary relief. Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). But in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), a Title VII action
against a state for money damages, the Court permitted recovery, ruling that "the Eleventh
Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies ... are necessarily limited
by the enforcement provisions of§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 456. The Court held
that when Congress enacts legislation to enforce the fourteenth amendment, it "may provide for
private suits against States or State officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other con-
texts." Id.
112. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan charac-
terized the Court's statement as "dictum" because resolution of the issue was not necessary to the
decision of the case. Id. at 350.
113. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 18, § 29.1.
114. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976).
115. Id. § 1346(b).
116. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
117. Section 1346(b) provides that the federal courts shall have jurisdiction over
claims against the United States, for money damages ... for injury or loss of property,
or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment,
under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant. ...
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
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the government from liability in Bivens false arrest actions." 8 The sec-
tion was amended in 1974 to provide that "with regard to acts or omis-
sions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States
Government, the provisions of [the Act imposing liability] shall apply
to any claim arising . . . out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. '19 Although
the amendment makes no direct reference to Bivens, its legislative his-
tory indicates that Congress intended to subject the United States to
vicarious liability for violations of the fourth amendment. 20 It is un-
clear, however, whether the section covers actions against the federal
government for other types of constitutional tort claims.12 '
Assuming that the United States is vicariously liable for the consti-
tutional torts of its employees, the question remains whether the federal
government can invoke the qualified immunity of its agents.12 2 In the
only case that has raised the issue, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that the qualified immunity defense was available to
agents of the federal government. 23 The court reasoned that the impo-
sition of liability without regard to the individual officer's good faith
would be such a substantial departure from general principles of re-
spondeal superior and would impose such a significant burden on the
treasury that a clearer expression of legislative intent would be required
than that manifested in the amendment of section 2680(h).' 24 Never-
theless, the Act contains no provision expressly authorizing the invoca-
tion of such a defense.
The government might also seek to avoid liability by relying on
section 2680(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act,'2 5 which retains sover-
118. Section 2680(h), as originally enacted, immunized the United States from liability for
"[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights." Id.
§ 2680(h).
119. Id. § 2680(h).
120. Boger, Gitenstein, & Verkuil, The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional TortsrAmendment:
An Interpretative Anaysis, 54 N.C.L. Rav. 497, 510-16 (1976).
121. Legislation to remove the ambiguity was unsuccessfully introduced during the 95th Con-
gress. S. 2117, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977); H.R. 9219, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977). This bill
would have authorized a cause of action against the United States "where the claim sounding in
tort for money damages arises under the Constitution of the United States when [an] employee of
the Government is acting within the scope of his office or employment, or under the color
thereof." Id.
122. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
123. Norton v. United States, 581 F.2d 390 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1003 (1978).
124. 581 F.2d at 397.
125. Section 2680(a) reads:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exer-
cising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a fed-
1256 [Vol. 67:1242
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eign immunity for actions arising out of the exercise of discretionary
functions. Under section 2680(a), bad faith conduct does not defeat
sovereign immunity) 26 There is an obvious disparity between the lan-
guage of section 2680(a) and those recent Supreme Court decisions
governing public official immunity that reject the ministerial-discre-
tionary dichotomy in favor of a qualified immunity for good faith con-
duct.' 7 If a federal official commits a bad faith constitutional violation
in the performance of a discretionary function, the United States may
be exonerated from liability despite the official's culpability. It there-
fore remains unclear whether Congress intended to impose vicarious
liability on the United States for the constitutional torts of its agents
committed in a discretionary capacity when it amended section
2680(h). 1 28
b. Other Defenses
Although immunities are by far the most important defenses in
constitutional tort actions, other defenses are available. In Monroe v.
Pape,129 the Court stated that section 1983 "should be read against the
background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natu-
ral consequences of his actions."' 30 This language has been interpreted
to mean that common law defenses are applicable to section 1983 ac-
tions. 13 1 While the Supreme Court has not discussed the availability of
common law defenses in Bivens actions,' 32 the Court could conceivably
look to section 1983 cases for guidance.'3 3 Different defenses might be
formulated in response to these two types of actions, however, insofar
as Bivens actions are governed exclusively by federal common law,' 34
while section 1983 actions, in contrast, may be subject to state law.' 35
eral agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion in-
volved be abused.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
126. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 505 (dictum).
127. See text accompanying notes 92-100 supra.
128. See Boger, Gitenstein, & Verkuil, supra note 120, at 530-32.
129. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
130. Id. at 187.
131. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556-57 (1967) (recognized common law defenses of good
faith and probable cause); Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1974) (self-defense), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 436 F. Supp. 657, 664 (M.D. Pa. 1977)
(unclean hands), aJ'd in part and remanded in part, 590 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1978).
132. Lower courts have begun to recognize the common law defenses in Bivens actions. See,
e.g., Payne v. Government of Dist. of Columbia, 559 F.2d 809, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (self-defense).
133. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 496-504 (citing and approving cases that apply
§ 1983 public official immunity doctrines to Bivens actions).
134. See note 12 supra. But see Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
438 U.S. 907 (1978) (applying state statute of limitations to both § 1983 and Bivens actions).
135. See note 12 supra. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides in pertinent part:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the pro-
19791 1257
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3. Remedies
Although declaratory judgments, injunctive relief, and damages
are the most commonly requested remedies in section 1983 actions,
3 6
the statute authorizes any type of legal or equitable relief.'37 Bivens, on
the other hand, recognizes only the right to recover damages.138 The
Supreme Court has not directly addressed the propriety of other types
of remedies in actions against federal officials who have violated the
Constitution, but it has sustained the jurisdiction of federal courts to
protect constitutional rights by entertaining declaratory judgment ac-
tions139 and issuing injunctions. 140 Consequently, the full range of le-




The Carey Court declined to recognize presumed general damages
for procedural due process deprivations. It did, however, authorize re-
covery of proven compensatory damages. This section critically ana-
lyzes the Court's refusal to allow presumed damages and addresses
unresolved questions regarding the recovery of proven compensatory
damages.
visions of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title "CRIMES," for the
protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindica-
tion, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so
far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are
not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable
remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by
the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such
civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial
and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punish-
ment on the party found guilty.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). In Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589 n.5 (1978), the Court
declined to decide whether § 1988's reference to "the common law" is a reference to the decisional
law of the forum state or to federal common law.
136. E.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (action for declaratory judgment, injunctive
relief, and damages). See .Developments, supra note 67, at 1217-50.
137. The statute provides that the defendant "shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
138. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
139. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
140. See cases cited in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. at 402-07 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). In Bell v. Hood, 327.U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (action for damages), the Court observed
that it is "established practice. . . to sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions
to protect rights safeguarded by the Constitution."
1258
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A. Presumed Compensatory Damages
The Carey plaintiffs advanced two theories to support their con-
tention that general damages should be awarded without proof of ac-
tual loss. First, they argued in the conjunctive that presumed damages
should be awarded because "constitutional rights are valuable in and of
themselves, and because of the need to deter violations of constitutional
rights."'4 1 The Court inquired into the intended functions of section
1983 damages and concluded that "the basic purpose of a section 1983
damages award should be to compensate persons for injuries caused by
the deprivation of constitutional rights."' 42 Furthermore, the Court
stated that even if Congress intended section 1983 damages to deter the
deprivation of constitutional rights, "there is no evidence that it meant
to establish a deterrent more formidable than that inherent in the
award of compensatory damages."' 43 The Court thus explicitly re-
jected the plaintiffs' deterrence argument. At the same time, however,
it implicitly rejected the plaintiffs' contention that constitutional rights
are inherently valuable by narrowly construing the scope of the inter-
ests compensable under section 1983. The Court restricted the range of
compensable "injuries' 144 to pecuniary losses, such as the loss of edu-
cation or employment opportunities, and nonpecuniary losses of a per-
sonal nature, such as emotional distress.145 It thereby excluded
nonpersonal intangible losses, including the inherent value loss which
results from- the violation of a constitutional right. In contrast, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had broadly construed the
interests compensable under section 1983, recognizing that there is a
compensable "injury inherent in the nature of the wrong" attendant
upon a violation of procedural due process. 14
The second theory advanced by the plaintiffs was that "even if the
purpose of a section 1983 damages award is. . . primarily to compen-
sate persons for injuries that are caused by the deprivation of constitu-
tional rights, every deprivation of procedural due process may be
presumed to cause some injury."' 47 Because it had already determined
that the loss of an inherently valuable constitutional right was not a
141. 435 U.S. at 254.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 256-57.
144. Early in its decision the Court said: "Rights, constitutional and otherwise, do not exist in
a vacuum. Their purpose is to protect persons from injuries to particular interests, and their con-
tours are shaped by the interests they protect." Id. Further evidence of the Court's restrictive
definition of the term "injuries" may be found in the following statement: "[Tihe principle that
damages are designed to compensate persons for injuries caused by the deprivation of rights
hardly could have been foreign to the many lawyers in Congress in 1871." Id. at 255.
145. Id. at 259-64.
146. Piphus v. Carey, 545 F.2d at 31.
147. 435 U.S. at 254.
19791 1259
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compensable section 1983 injury, the Court confined its inquiry to pe-
cuniary and personal nonpecuniary losses, concluding that damages
should not be presumed for either type of harm. 48 Thus, the Court's
discussion of presumed damages was necessarily incomplete; it had by
its own logic obviated the possibility of an award of presumed damages
for the infringement of an inherently valuable constitutional right.
The most perplexing aspect of Carey's silence on the propriety of
awarding presumed general damages for the inherent value of
procedural due process is the Court's failure to follow the method de-
scribed in the Carey opinion for fashioning section 1983 remedies. The
Court suggested that the common law rules governing tort damages
should be regarded as providing "an appropriate starting point,"1 49 but
not necessarily "a complete solution' 0 to the damages issues in a sec-
tion 1983 action. It stressed the importance of first identifying the in-
terests protected by a particular constitutional right, and then
determining whether those interests are also protected by the common
law.' 51 If the interests are protected by the common law, the standard
tort remedies are directly applicable to the section 1983 action.'52 If
they are not, "the rules governing compensation for injuries caused by
the deprivation of constitutional rights should be tailored to the inter-
ests protected by the particular right in question-just as the common
law rules of damages themselves were defined by the interests protected
in the various branches of tort law."'' 53
The Court properly identified the two interests protected by the
procedural due process clause. One is to guarantee the "feeling of just
treatment" by the government.1 54 The other is to protect persons
against "the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty or prop-
erty." 15 5 The Court also correctly recognized that there is no common
law tort action to redress deprivations of procedural due process.' 56
However, when it identified the compensable losses caused by a depri-
vation of the "feeling of just treatment," it ignored the inherent value
of that interest and focused exclusively on the "feelings of mental and
emotional distress [aroused] in the individual who is denied" the
right.' 57 Furthermore, when the Court consulted the common law for
148. Id. at 259-64.




153. Id. at 259.
154. Id. at 261.
155. Id. at 259.
156. Id. at 258.
157. Id. at 261.
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remedies protecting interests comparable to those guaranteed by the
procedural due process clause, it ignored the most relevant body of case
law.
In its examination of analogous common law remedies, the Court
cited the following principle from a chapter entitled "Damages in Acci-
dent Cases" in volume two of Harper and James' torts treatise:' "The
cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-American law is that of com-
pensation for the injury caused to the plaintiff by defendant's breach of
duty." 159 Negligence actions are indeed brought primarily to compen-
sate, and therefore proven compensatory damages are the only remedy
allowed in such actions.' 60 But section 1983 actions for deprivations of
procedural due process are not analogous to negligence actions. In-
stead, the intangible constitutional interests protected by the procedural
due process clause more closely resemble the dignitary interests pro-
tected by such tort actions as defamation, false imprisonment, and in-
vasion of privacy.' 6 1 These actions are discussed by Harper and James
in volume one of their treatise, 162 where the authors state that deter-
rence and the vindication of personal interests are as important as com-
pensation in dignitary tort actions, 63 and that these three objectives are
accomplished through an award of presumed general damages.'"
After consulting the common law, the Court properly asked
whether Congress intended section 1983 damages to perform the same
functions as those performed by common law damages.' 6 5 In its search
for indicia of legislative intent, the Court found that neither the text of
section 1983 nor its legislative history contained any express statement
concerning the functions of constitutional tort damages. 166 The lan-
guage of the statute merely provides for an "action at law,"' 6 7 and the
158. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 18, § 25.1.
159. 435 U.S. at 254-55 (quoting 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 18, § 25.1).
160. Nominal damages are not recoverable in negligence actions. D. DOBBS, supra note 14,
§ 3.8.
161. Yudof, supra note 10, at 1371-74. As further evidence that § 1983 actions are more
closely analogous to the common law dignitary torts than to negligence actions, it should be noted
that the transgressions of government officials were typically actionable under the writ of trespass
at the time that § 1983 was enacted. Hill, supra note 10, at 1132.
162. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 18, §§ 3.6-3.9, 4.7, 5.30, 9.6-9.7.
163. E.g., id. § 5.30, at 468-70. See also D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.1. In England, the
courts have recognized two components of compensatory damages awards in actions for dignitary
harm: "material loss" and "aggravated damages." Cassell & Co. v. Broome, [1972] A.C. 1027,
1070-74 (defamation action). The latter are defined as damages for the plaintiffs subjective losses,
and "they inflict an added burden on the defendant proportionate to his conduct." Id. at 1071.
Thus, the English courts also distinguish between the functions of compensatory damages in negli-
gence and dignitary tort actions.
164. See authorities cited in notes 162-63 supra.
165. 435 U.S. at 255-57.
166. Id. at 255.
167. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). For the full text of the statute, see note 2 supra.
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members of Congress did not discuss their reasons for authorizing legal
relief' 68 Seeking circumstantial evidence of legislative intent, the
Court turned to the principles of the common law of damages extant in
1871.169 Since the Court focused on the rules governing damages in
negligence cases 170 instead of those governing dignitary tort dam-
ages, 17 1 however, this historical exercise led to the same questionable
conclusion that compensation is the basic purpose of section 1983 dam-
ages. ' 72
The Court compounded its error by overlooking available circum-
stantial indicia of legislative intent. Section 1983 was enacted as part of
the Ku Klux Klan Act of 187 1.71 The Act grew out of a message to
Congress from President Grant which called for legislation to "secure
life, liberty, and property and the enforcement of law in all parts of the
United States."'174 President Grant was principally concerned with the
"lawless conditions in the South" created by the Ku Klux Klan activi-
ties and the failure of state governments to punish the wrongdoers or
provide redress for Klan victims. 175 Therefore, one of the primary
objectives of the Act was to provide a federal forum in which both
blacks and whites could sue for violations of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 176 This historical setting persuasively suggests that Congress in-
tended section 1983 damages both to deter Klan activities and to
vindicate the constitutional rights of the Klan's victims, 177 as well as to
compensate the victims for their actual losses. Thus, it would have
been appropriate for the Court to have inferred that Congress intended
section 1983 damages to serve the three purposes of common law digni-
tary tort damages.
Having misconstrued Congress' intent, the Court went on to make
an independent evaluation of the need for section 1983 damages to ac-
complish noncompensatory objectives. Perhaps because the plaintiffs
did not advance vindication as a justification for awarding presumed
168. As stated by the Court in Carey, "[t]he Members of the Congress that enacted § 1983 did
not address directly the question of damages." 435 U.S. at 255.
169. Id. at 255-56 & n.9.
170. See text accompanying notes 158-60 supra.
171. See text accompanying notes 161-64 supra.
172. 435 U.S. at 254.
173. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. For a description of the Act's historical back-
ground, see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See also M. BERGER, EQUALITY BY STATUTE
(rev. ed. 1967); Gressman, The Unhappy History of CivilRighis Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323
(1952); Kinoy, The Constitutional Right ofNegro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 387 (1967).
174. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 173.
175. Id. at 174.
176. Id. at 170-74; Nahmod, supra note 10, at 10-11; Comment, supra note 10, at 1026.
177. Section 1988 explicitly recognizes the vindicatory function of § 1983 insofar as it pro-
vides that federal courts shall have jurisdiction over § 1983 actions "for the protection of all per-
sons. . . in their civil rights, and for their vindication." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
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general damages, the Court focused exclusively on deterrence. 178  It
concluded that the existing deterrents-the criminal law, the right to
recover attorney's fees, and the possibility of obtaining punitive dam-
ages-were adequate.1 79
Each of these deterrents, however, has its limitations. Specifically,
the criminal counterpart of section 1983, 18 U.S.C. section 242, has not
proven to be an effective deterrent because "[its use is bound to be
sporadic at best."18s0 The sporadic nature of its use most likely is a
function of prosecutorial reluctance to charge officials with whom they
maintain close working relationships. 18 1 Another limitation on the effi-
cacy of a criminal action is the requirement of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant acted with specific intent to infringe a
constitutional right.' 82 This requirement, coupled with the reluctance
of jurors to return verdicts against public officials, 183 ensures "that even
when prosecutions are brought, convictions will be rare."' 1 4
Perhaps in part because of the infrequency with which prosecutors
invoke section 242, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976.185 This statute is designed to encourage citizens to
act as private attorneys general.'86 Although the prospect of recovering
attorney's fees from defendants will encourage the filing of civil actions
under section 1983, it is not enough that lawyers have an incentive to
sue. Prospective plaintiffs also must have a reason to litigate. It is
doubtful that the remedy authorized by Carey-a nominal damages
award of one dollar-will motivate many aggrieved citizens to act as
private prosecutors.
Apparently recognizing the inadequate deterrent effect of nominal
damages plus attorney's fees, the Court suggested in Carey that it might
be willing to award exemplary or punitive damages "in a proper case"
under section 1983 "with the specific purpose of deterring or punishing
violations of constitutional rights."' 87 But the Court indicated that pu-
178. 435 U.S. at 254-57 & nn.10-11.
179. Id. at 257 n.ll. For an empirical study suggesting that § 1983 damages have very little
deterrent effect, see Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 809-14 (1979).
180. Newman, supra note 6, at 450.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.; Project, supra note 179.
184. Newman, supra note 6, at 450.
185. The Act amended 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to read in part as follows: "In any action or proceed-
ing to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title. . . , the court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attor-
ney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). For a discussion of the Act, see Comment,
The Civil .Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. Rnv. 562 (1978); Comment,
The Civil Rights Attorneys'FeesAwards.Act of 1976, 34 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 205 (1977).
186. 435 U.S. at 257 n.ll.
187. Id.
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nitive damages could be imposed only upon proof of malicious inten-
tion.18 8  Consequently, only the more egregious constitutional
violations would be deterred by such a remedy.' 8 9 In contrast, an
award of presumed general damages would have the potential to deter
the entire spectrum of constitutional violations.
The Court's disallowance of presumed general damages for the in-
herent value of procedural due process is not surprising in light of its
conclusion that compensation is the basic purpose of an award of dam-
ages under section 1983. Presumed general damages are recoverable at
common law only when a tort action serves three objectives: deter-
rence, vindication, and compensation. 190 Had the Court consulted the
proper body of common law doctrine, considered all the relevant indi-
cia of legislative intent, and conducted a more thorough independent
evaluation of the purposes to be served by section 1983 legal relief, it
presumably would have acknowledged the deterrent and vindicatory
functions of section 1983 damages. Upon such analysis it would have
become apparent to the Court that presumed general damages are the
only available remedy to redress the loss of an intangible constitutional
interest worthy of legal protection.' 9 '
Although the significance of presumed general damages for the in-
herent value of procedural due process eluded the Supreme Court, the
lower federal courts had recognized the need for this remedy in several
cases decided before Carey.'92 In Unified School Distric No. 480 v. Ep-
person,193 for example, two public school teachers claimed that their
employment had been terminated without a hearing as a result of their
collective bargaining activities on behalf of the National Educational
Association. The trial court accepted the school district's assertion that
budgetary considerations had prompted the terminations. 194 Upon ap-
peal the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiffs
were not entitled to reinstatement with back pay and consequential
damages.' 95 It remanded the case, however, for an award of presumed
188. Id.
189. For a discussion of the state of mind required to impose punitive damages, see text ac-
companying notes 304-22 infra.
190. See D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.1.
191. See text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
192. Procedural due process plaintiffs were allowed to state a cause of action for presumed
general damages in four cases prior to Carey. Unified School Dist. No. 480 v. Epperson, 551 F.2d
254, 260-61 (10th Cir. 1977); Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569, 579-
80 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976); Bruce v. Board of Regents, 414 F. Supp. 559,
569 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Endress v. Brookdale Community College, 144 N.J. Super. 109, 127, 364
A.2d 1080, 1097-98 (1976).
193. 551 F.2d 254 (10th Cir. 1977).
194. Id. at 256-57.
195. Id.
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general damages. 96 The court's justification of the remand persua-
sively articulates the need for presumed damages to redress procedural
due process violations:
To reach a contrary result in the instant case would to us be a bit incon-
gruous, in that we would be holding that there was no relief or remedy
whatsoever for an admitted violation of a constitutional right. The
right to notice and a hearing before termination or nonrenewal of a
teaching contract, assuming the particular individual enjoys such a
right, is an important one, and to hold that such a right may be violated
without affording the injured party any redress of any kind tends to
deprive the right of meaning.
197
The Carey Court not only refused to allow compensatory damages
for the inherent value loss alleged by the plaintiffs, but also declined to
allow presumed damages for the mental anguish and emotional distress
directly caused by a procedural due process violation. 98 The Court
rejected the plaintiffs' analogy to the presumed damages recoverable in
defamation per se actions because (1) "it is not reasonable to assume
that every departure from procedural due process, no matter what the
circumstances or how minor, inherently is as likely to cause injury to
reputation and distress;"' 99 and (2) it could foresee "no particular diffi-
culty in producing evidence that mental and emotional distress actually
was caused by the denial of procedural due process itself.'' °  The
Court may have felt that it was inappropriate to presume damages for
such losses because they are unlikely to occur. The Court suggested
this concern when it observed that, "[i]n contrast to the immediately
distressing effect of defamation per se, a person may not even know
that procedures were deficient until he enlists the aid of counsel to chal-
lenge a perceived substantive deprivation." 20 1 On the other hand, the
Court may have been reluctant to presume damages because it had dis-
allowed general damages for similar losses in Gertz.2°2 In Gertz, how-
ever, the state court's award of presumed damages adversely affected
the constitutional freedoms of speech and press.20 3 In contrast, the Ca-
196. Id. at 260-61.
197. Id.
198. 435 U.S. at 264.
199. Id. at 263.
200. Id.
201. Id. The most distressing aspect of this statement is the implicit proposition that procedu-
ral due process deprivations cause compensable harm only when they produce mental or emo-
tional distress. This follows of course from the Court's initial decision to exclude the inherent
value of constitutional rights from the scope of the interests protected by compensatory damages
under § 1983.
202. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
203. Id. at 349. For a description of the Court's holding in Gertz, see text accompanying
notes 24-25 supra.
1979]
HeinOnline  -- 67 Cal. L. Rev. 1265 1979
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
rey Court's recognition of presumed general damages would have pro-
tected a fundamental constitutional right.
The Court also discussed the appropriateness of awarding pre-
sumed general damages for consequential losses caused by a
procedural due process violation.204 The Court and the parties agreed
that proven damages would adequately compensate any harm suffered
by a plaintiff as a result of an unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or
property. °5 This aspect of the Court's decision is commendable be-
cause it reduces the likelihood of presumed damages resulting in a
windfall to the plaintiff. Although a plaintiff may have difficulty prov-
ing the value of items of consequential loss caused by a procedural due
process violation,20 6 it is preferable to require the plaintiff to marshall
the available evidence, subject to a lenient standard of proof, than to
give the jury discretion to presume such losses.
To summarize, the Court in Carey refused to award presumed
compensatory damages for any type of harm resulting from a depriva-
tion of procedural due process. Yet, tort principles and the legislative
history of section 1983 suggest that constitutional tort damages should
perform deterrent and vindicatory, as well as compensatory, functions.
Alternative remedies have not diminished the need to recognize pre-
sumed damages to achieve these objectives. Therefore, the Court
should at least have allowed presumed general damages for the plain-
tiffs' loss of the inherent value of procedural due process. Furthermore,
presumed damages should perhaps have been recognized for the
mental anguish and emotional distress directly caused by the
procedural due process deprivation.
The Carey Court's denial of presumed general damages may be
partially explained by the unique nature of procedural due process
rights. Although these rights have an intangible dignitary value, they
protect no specific substantive interest.2 0 7 This distinguishes them from
the types of intangible interests for which general damages are nor-
mally presumed at common law,208 and may help to distinguish them
from other constitutional rights as well. In this regard it is appropriate
to reemphasize that the Court's denial of presumed general damages in
Carey is expressly restricted to procedural due process cases20 9 brought
204. 435 U.S. at 260-65. Consequential losses are the injuries caused by an unjustified depri-
vation of life, liberty, or property that could have been avoided by allowing a prior hearing.
205. Id.
206. Pipus v. Carey, 545 F.2d at 32.
207. For an excellent discussion of the interests protected by the procedural due process
clause, see Saphire, Specfying Due Process Values: Towarda More Responsive Approach to Proce-
duralProtection, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 111 (1978).
208. See text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
209. 435 U.S. at 265.
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under section 1983.210
B. Proven Compensatory Damages
The Carey Court authorized the recovery of proven compensatory
damages2 ' for the tangible and intangible losses precipitated by a con-
stitutional violation.212 However, the Court did not address several im-
portant questions concerning the availability and extent of such an
award. Specifically, further definition is required on the nature of com-
pensable intangible losses, the evidentiary standard for compensatory
relief, and the causation test for compensatory damages.
1. Types of Intangible Losses
The Carey Court ruled that a plaintiff who has been deprived of
procedural due process may obtain compensation for the resulting dis-
tress irrespective of whether the substantive deprivation was justi-
fied.213 Although the Court did not define "distress" precisely, it did
state that the term includes "mental suffering or emotional anguish." '214
Unfortunately, the Court did not expand upon its itemization of recov-
erable intangible losses. In contrast, in Gertz v. Welch215 the Court de-
fined the "actual injury" compensable in defamation actions as
"impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. '216  Lower federal
courts have awarded damages in section 1983217 and Bivens218 actions
210. Carey is not binding in a Bivens action because the Court in Carey was construing con-
gressional intent regarding a statutory cause of action, whereas Bivens is a judicially created ac-
tion. The Bivens Court had no occasion to discuss the deterrent or vindicatory functions of
compensatory damages because the plaintiff in that case sought damages for compensatory pur-
poses only. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. at 407-08 (Harlan, J., concurring).
211. 435 U.S. at 259-64.
212. Recovery for tangible losses should present few special problems because the application
of standard common law principles usually will ensure adequate compensation. Thus, the focus
of this section will be on damages for intangible loss. For a statement of the standard common
law principles governing proven compensatory damages, see D. DOBBS, supra note 14, §§ 3.1-.7.
For a discussion of the relationship between common law damages and constitutional tort dam-
ages, see Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d 519, 528-31 (10th Cir. 1979).
213. 435 U.S. at 266.
214. Id. at 264 n.20. In an interesting post-Carey decision, the Seventh Circuit has ruled that
the substantive due process clause protects against arbitrary intrusions on both emotional and
physical well-being. White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979) (action for emotional dis-
tress).
215. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
216. Id. at 350.
217. E.g., Konczak v. Tyrrell, 603 F.2d 13, 17 (7th Cir. 1979) (mental distress, humiliation,
loss of reputation, pain and suffering); Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205, 1209-10 (5th Cir. 1979)
(humiliation); Vetters v. Berry, 575 F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1978) (pain and suffering, humiliation,
mental distress); Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.) (embarrassment, humiliation, per-
sonal helplessness), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971); Manfredonia v. Barry, 401 F. Supp. 762
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (public notoriety, embarrassment); Stokes v. Lecce, 384 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa.
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for all of the losses identified in Gertz, recognizing that such losses may
result from the violation of constitutional rights. Since this approach is
consistent with the common law principle that a plaintiff should be
compensated for all losses proximately caused by the defendant's
wrongful act,2 19 the Supreme Court should follow the lead of the lower
courts in allowing recovery for personal humiliation or damage to rep-
utation which has resulted from a constitutional tort defendant's ac-
tionable conduct.
After Paul v. Davis220 there may be some confusion as to whether
constitutional tort plaintiffs can recover damages for incidental harm to
reputation. In Paul, the Court held that a complaint seeking compen-
sation solely for harm to reputation failed to state a cause of action
under section 1983 because damage to reputation is not actionable as a
deprivation of either "liberty" or "property" under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 1 At least one court has con-
strued Paul broadly to preclude legal relief for harm to reputation in all
section 1983 actions.222 A preferable reading of the opinion, however,
would restrict its holding to cases in which the only actionable conduct
is harm to the plaintiff's reputation.223 Such a construction would per-
mit compensation when harm to reputation is one of several losses re-
sulting from the violation of a constitutional right. It would at the
same time, however, preclude the use of a section 1983 action to avoid
the constraints that have been developed to protect defamation defen-
dants.224
2 Proof of Intangible Losses
Presumably because the plaintiffs offered no evidence of distress,
the Carey Court declined to discuss the critically important matter of
the quantum of proof required to sustain an award of damages for in-
1974) (damage to reputation); Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 F. Supp. 585 (D. Minn. 1973) (embarrass-
ment); Sexton v. Gibbs, 327 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (humiliation, embarrassment, discom-
fort), aI'dper curiam, 446 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972); Rhoads v.
Horvat, 270 F. Supp. 307 (D. Colo. 1967) (pain and suffering, humiliation).
218. Payne v. Government of Dist. of Columbia, 559 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (extreme
mental anguish); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975) (stigmatization, invasion of pri-
vacy, interference with personality development).
219. D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.3.
220. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
221. Id. at 710-12.
222. Cox v. Northern Va. Transp. Comm'n, 551 F.2d 555 (4th Cir. 1976).
223. See, e.g., Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330,338 (7th Cir. 1979) (allowing recovery for harm
to reputation caused by a denial of equal protection); Collier v. Bachman, 421 F. Supp. 869, 870
(E.D. Mich. 1976) (allowing recovery for harm to reputation caused by a denial of procedural due
process).
224. To forestall such attempts at circumvention, the courts have recognized defamation de-
fenses in "false light" invasion of privacy cases. W. PROSSER, supra note 86, at 812-14.
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tangible losses.22  Lower federal courts, however, have expressed
widely divergent views on this issue.226 Some lower courts have
adopted a stringent evidentiary standard. In Perez v. Rodriguez Bou,
2 27
for example, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit approved an
award of no more than nominal damages in an action by suspended
public school students because
the only evidence of actual injury is plaintiffs' own statements that they
experienced some psychological discomfort as a result of their suspen-
sions. There is no evidence of loss of employment or employment op-
portunities, or delay in meeting academic requirements, or significant
harm to plaintiffs' reputation in the community, or medically cogniza-
ble psychological distress. In such circumstances courts are not in-
dined to award compensatory damages for general mental distress.228
The court thus refused to premise recovery upon the plaintiffs' testi-
mony and proof of the circumstances surrounding the twelve-day sus-
pensions. Instead, it implicitly required medical expert testimony to
substantiate mental distress and explicitly required proof of "significant
harm" to recover for loss to reputation.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, on the other hand,
has taken a less restrictive approach to the requisite quantum of proof.
In United States ex rel Larkins v. Oswald,22 9 the court affirmed a
$1,000 compensatory damage award to a prisoner whose seven-day
term of solitary confinement, issued without a hearing, was extended
for an additional five days. The court required no proof of mental dis-
tress beyond the plaintiff's testimony.230 Of course, there is a signifi-
cant difference between a twelve-day suspension from school and a
twelve-day isolation in solitary confinement. Nevertheless, the Second
Circuit appears more willing than the First Circuit to allow the jury to
infer mental distress from the plaintiff's testimony coupled with proof
of the surrounding circumstances.
The housing discrimination cases suggest that the quantum of
proof required may vary depending upon the importance of the consti-
tutional right at stake. The lower federal courts in these section 1982
cases have permitted inferences of compensable loss from surrounding
225. 435 U.S. at 267 n.25.
226. See text accompanying notes 227-32 infra. The wide range of evidentiary standards has
produced an equally wide range of awards.
227. 575 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1978).
228. Id. at 25. But see Rivera Morales v. Benitez de Rexach, 541 F.2d 882 (1st Cir. 1976) (a
pre-Carey case awarding a substantial sum for intangible losses based on very little evidence).
For a case in which psychiatric testimony was introduced into evidence, see Aumiller v. University
of Delaware, 434 F. Supp. 1273, 1309 (D. Del. 1977).
229. 510 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1975). But see Stolberg v. Board of Trustees, 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.
1973).
230. 510 F.2d at 590.
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circumstances"' and have sustained recoveries based solely upon the
plaintiff's testimony.232 Their leniency may be attributable to the ele-
ment of racial discrimination present in section 1982 cases.
While the Court in Carey did not address the evidentiary question
directly, it did rule that the "distress" for which recovery is permissible
"may be evidenced by one's conduct and observed by others. 233 Fur-
thermore, the Court could "foresee no particular difficulty in producing
evidence that mental and emotional distress actually was caused by the
denial of procedural due process itself,"234 for "[d]istress is a personal
injury familiar to the law, customarily proved by showing the nature
and circumstances of the wrong and its effect on the plaintiff. ' 235 These
statements suggest that the Court will eventually favor the adoption of
a lenient standard of proof for intangible losses. Such a development
would ultimately ameliorate the inequities engendered by the Carey
Court's rejection of presumed compensatory damages.236
3. Causation
The Court in Carey adopted a stringent test of causation which
will aggravate the effects of the Court's decision to disallow presumed
general damages for violations of procedural due process. The plaintiff
must prove that the deprivation of procedural due process was the pri-
mary cause of each loss claimed. 237 The test will not have a particu-
larly adverse impact in instances of an unjustified deprivation of life,
liberty, or property since it will permit recovery for both the harm
caused by the denial of a hearing and the substantive violation. In the
Carey case, for example, it would allow the plaintiffs to recover for lost
school time and for any distress caused by either the failure to conduct
a hearing or the unjustified suspension.238 The test will operate more
restrictively, however, when the substantive deprivation would have
been justified had a hearing been held. In such cases, the only compen-
sable harm may be the mental anguish and emotional distress directly
231. Eg., Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974); Parker v. Shonfeld, 409 F.
Supp. 876, 879 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
232. E.g., Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky. 1976); Walker v. Fox, 395 F. Supp.
1303 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
233. 435 U.S. at 264 n.20.
234. Id. at 263.
235. Id. at 263-64 (footnote omitted).
236. Consider, for example, the post-Carey case of Morrow v. Igleburger, 584 F.2d 767 (6th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1118 (1979), in which plaintiff was awarded $1,000 for out-of-
pocket expenses and emotional distress suffered during detention prior to arraignment on forgery
charges for one day longer than was reasonable.
237. 435 U.S. at 260. See also Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 285-86 (1977).
238. Piphus v. Carey, 545 F.2d at.32.
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resulting from the procedural due process violation.23 9 The trier of fact
would then have to perform the almost impossible task of distinguish-
ing the distress caused by the unjustified procedural deprivation from
that caused by the justified substantive deprivation.
The Court has adopted a similarly restrictive test of causation in
first amendment cases. 24 It has explicitly stated that reinstatement of a
public employee who has been suspended or terminated from employ-
ment in retaliation for the exercise of free speech rights will be denied if
the defendant can show "by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would have reached the same decision as to [the plaintiff's] reemploy-
ment [or continued employment] even in the absence of the protected
conduct."24 The justification for this rule is that the employee should
not benefit from involvement in a constitutionally protected activity. 42
In contrast, the housing discrimination cases decided by the lower
courts under section 1982 have adopted a more liberal test of causa-
tion.24 If a plaintiff proves that race was one reason for the defend-
ant's refusal to rent or sell, the defendant cannot avoid liability by
showing that other reasons existed for the refusal.244 These cases sug-
gest that the Court may adopt a more liberal "substantial factor" test
for the violation of select constitutional rights which are so fundamen-
tal that a plaintiff should be able to obtain redress despite the presence
of concurrent causes.
239. 435 U.S. at 263. The Carey Court disapproved a line of cases allowing the recovery of
consequential damages for the period between the date of the procedural due process deprivation
and the time when a hearing either was or could have been held. (d. at 260 n.15. Some of those
cases had been decided by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and have now been over-
ruled. Burt v. Abel, 585 F.2d 613, 615-16 (4th Cir. 1978).
240. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
241. Id. at 287. In Mt. Healthy, the trial court had found that the plaintiff's release of a memo
regarding the defendant's adoption of a dress code for teachers was a "substantial factor" in the
defendant's decision not to rehire him. The Court remanded the case for a determination of
whether the defendant would have reached the same decision on the grounds that the plaintiff had
had arguments with school employees, referred to students as "sons of bitches," and made an
obscene gesture to two girls when they failed to obey his commands as cafeteria supervisor. The
Court ruled that if his contract would not have been renewed for the latter reasons, he could not
be reinstated, even though his dismissal stemmed in part from his exercise of protected free speech
rights.
242. In the words of the Court, "[t]he constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated
if such an employee is placed in no worse a position than if he had not engaged in the conduct."
Id. at 285-86.
The lower courts have also applied a restrictive test of causation in first amendment actions
for damages. See, eg., Stoddard v. School Dist. No. 1, 590 F.2d 829, 834 (10th Cir. 1979); Buise v.
Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223, 231 (7th Cir. 1978).
243. See, eg., Bishop v. Pecsok, 431 F. Supp. 34,37 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Hughes v. Dyer, 378 F.
Supp. 1305 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
244. E.g., Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1970).




The Carey Court held that nominal damages are recoverable for
any violation of procedural due process, regardless of whether the re-
sulting substantive deprivation of life, liberty, or property is deemed to
be justified.245 Significantly, the Court authorized the recovery of nom-
inal damages not only to perform a declaratory function,246 but also to
vindicate a legal right.247 Noting that common law courts "tradition-
ally have vindicated deprivations of certain 'absolute' rights that are
not shown to have caused actual injury through the award of a nominal
sum of money," the Court concluded that the right to procedural due
process is absolute both because "of the importance to organized soci-
ety that procedural due process be observed" and because "it does not
depend upon the merits of a claimant's substantive assertions. '248
The Court specified that the nominal damage award should not
exceed the standard sum 249 of one dollar.250 This part of the Court's
decision will eliminate the confusion that has been generated by lower
court opinions awarding "nominal" damages approaching $1,000.2"1
However, the insubstantial amount of an award of nominal damages
underscores its limited utility as a separate and independent remedy.
Apart from the possibility of bringing a class action,252 potential plain-
tiffs are not apt to initiate constitutional tort litigation to recover nomi-
nal damages alone.253 The more typical pattern will consist of the
plaintiff suing for substantial monetary relief 254 and establishing the
violation of a constitutional right, but failing to recover either compen-
satory or punitive damages. The nominal damages remedy would then
justify the imposition of costs255 or attorney's fees256 on the defendant.




249. D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.8.
250. 435 U.S. at 267.
251. Eg., United States ex rel Motley v. Rundle, 340 F. Supp. 807 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
252. In one of the few cases that has considered the question, the court refused to allow a class
action solely for nominal damages to proceed because "It]he cost of administering such an award
would far outweigh the miniscule benefit that would accrue to plaintiffs." Callahan v. Sanders,
339 F. Supp. 814, 819 n.6 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aft'd, 466 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1972) (granting injunctive
relief). State courts have also been reluctant to allow class actions to proceed for nominal dam-
ages. Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Ct., 18 Cal. 3d 381, 556 P.2d 755, 134 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1976)
(citing other California cases); Klemow v. Time, Inc., 466 Pa. 189, 352 A.2d 12 (1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 828 (1976).
253. See D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.8.
254. See text accompanying note 43 supra (describing relief requested in Carey).
255. See, e.g., Joseph v. Rowlen, 425 F.2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1970) (nominal damages would have
been appropriate, although trial court failed to award them; costs assessed against the defendant).
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Alternatively, the plaintiff might sue for specific equitable relief,257 dis-
cover later that the claim for an injunction has become moot, and then
rely on the action for nominal damages to prevent the entire contro-
versy from being dismissed.25 8 In either situation, the nominal dam-
ages award will not provide the incentive for bringing suit; it will
merely serve to "rescue" the plaintiff whose case would otherwise be
dismissed.259
The Court's approval of nominal damages in Carey is confined to
procedural due process deprivations.260 It remains to be seen whether
the Court will broadly or only selectively authorize the recovery of
nominal damages for other constitutional violations. At common law,
nominal damages are awarded to vindicate important legal rights by
expressing disapproval of tortious conduct irrespective of whether the
defendant caused the plaintiff any actual or provable lOSS.261 Given the
fundamental significance of constitutional rights in American legal cul-
ture, nominal damages should be awarded in all section 1983 and Biv-
ens actions to facilitate the declaration and vindication of the entire
spectrum of constitutional rights.262 Indeed, after the Court's refusal to
recognize presumed general damages in Carey, nominal damages will
frequently constitute the exclusive legal expression of disapprobation of
constitutional violations by public officials.
256. See, e.g., Marr v. Rife, 545 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1976) (action brought under the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976)). In a 1976 amendment, Congress authorized the
court, in its discretion, to award a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs to the prevailing
party in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641
(1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)). An award of nominal damages should qualify the
plaintiff as a prevailing party under the statute. See, e.g., Perez v. University of Puerto Rico, 600
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1979); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 192, 197-98 (6th Cir.
1978), cer. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2053 (1979). Of course, the court, in its discretion, may still decline to
grant attorney's fees to a plaintiffwho has recovered no more than nominal damages. E.g., Hunt-
ley v. Community School Bd., 579 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1978).
257. See text accompanying note 43 supra (describing relief requested in Carey).
258. E.g., Davis v. Village Park II Realty Co., 578 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1978); Familias
Unidas v. Briscoe, 544 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1976).
259. See D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.8.
260. 435 U.S. at 266.
261. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 20.
262. The lower federal courts have awarded nominal damages to vindicate the first amend-
ment freedoms of speech and association. See, e.g., Davis v. Village Park II Realty Co., 578 F.2d
461 (2d Cir. 1978); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 544 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1976); Schiff v. Williams,
519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975). They have also granted nominal damages for unreasonable searches
and seizures in violation of the fourth amendment. Magnett v. Pelletier, 488 F.2d 33 (Ist Cir.
1973); Joseph v. Rowlen, 425 F.2d 1010 (7th Cir. 1970); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir.
1965).
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The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether
punitive damages are recoverable in section 1983263 or Bivens264 ac-
tions. Rather, the Court in Carey concluded that there was no basis for
a punitive damages award because the defendants had not acted "with
a malicious intention to deprive [plaintiffs] of their rights or to do them
other injury."2 65 At the same time, however, the Court indicated that it
might be willing to allow punitive damages in "a proper case" under
section 1983 "with the specific purpose of deterring or punishing viola-
tions of constitutional rights. 266 In so doing, the Court cited six cases
from as many circuits authorizing the recovery of punitive damages by
section 1983 plaintiffs, although it expressly refused to approve or dis-
approve them.267
A. The Functions of Punitive Damages in Constitutional Tort Actions
Punitive damages traditionally have been awarded to achieve at
least three distinct objectives: deterrence, punishment, and law en-
forcement. 268 To determine the propriety of punitive damages awards
in section 1983 and Bivens actions, each of these objectives must be
considered in the context of constitutional tort litigation.
The deterrence function of section 1983 and Bivens damages
serves to protect individuals against abuse by public officials.269 The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed that "[t]he availa-
263. The lower federal courts have approved punitive damages awards in § 1983 actions. See,
e.g., Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 105-06 (3d Cir. 1978); Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52, 54-
55 (2d Cir. 1977); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d at 87-88.
264. The lower federal courts have also allowed punitive damages in Bivens litigation. See,
e.g., Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 872 (3d Cir. 1975); Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393, 398
(6th Cir. 1975).
265. 435 U.S. at 257 n.l 1. This factual finding was made by the district court in the context of




268. D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.9; Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation,
74 MICH. L. REv. 1258, 1277-78 (1976). See also text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
In a line of cases that is generally disapproved, some courts have recognized compensation as
another function of punitive damages, particularly in actions for dignitary torts. D. DoBBs, s~ra
note 14, § 3.9. In these cases, punitive damages were awarded in part for "the wounded feelings of
the plaintiff." Id. There is an obvious similarity between an award of punitive damages in this
context and an award of general damages. The principal difference is that in order to recover
punitive damages the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with malice or engaged in
some form of aggravated conduct.
269. For a discussion of the deterrent purpose of § 1983, see text accompanying notes 177-89
supra. For an indication that damages in Bivens actions may perform either a deterrent or a
compensatory function, see 403 U.S. at 407-08 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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bility of punitive damages as a deterrent may be more significant than
ever today, in view of the apparent trend of decisions curtailing the
powers of federal courts to impose equitable remedies to terminate
[constitutional] violations."270 Recent developments abroad under-
score the importance of punitive damages as a deterrent against public
officials. In England, for example, the House of Lords has preserved
the generally disapproved punitive damages remedy in cases of "op-
pressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional actions by servants of govern-
ment." 271
Several commentators have questioned the efficacy of punitive
damages as a deterrent in the common law context. Such damages
have been characterized as "an invitation to engage in prejudice" re-
sulting in a "windfall to the plaintiff" with no proven deterrent ef-
fect.272 These criticisms, however, are less valid in the context of
constitutional tort litigation. A jury is more likely to respect a public
official in a section 1983 or Bivens action than a private citizen in a
typical tort action.273 Consequently, both the risk of prejudice to the
defendant and the amount of any windfall to the plaintiff are substan-
tially reduced. A survey of the range of punitive damages allowed by
the lower federal courts in section 1983274 and Bivens275 cases indicates
270. Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 105-06 (3d Cir. 1978).
271. Cassell & Co. v. Broome, [1972] A.C. 1027, 1130; Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129,
1226.
272. D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.9; Owen, supra note 268, at 1267 n.41.
273. See Newman, supra note 6, at 450.
274. The cases cited below are arranged by amount in ascending order. If two different
amounts were awarded, the case appears twice. Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974) ($250);
Johnson v. Shreveport Garment Co., 422 F. Supp. 526 (W.D. La. 1976) ($300 nominal and puni-
tive), ajfdmem, 577 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1978); Vargas v. Correa, 416 F. Supp. 266 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) ($300); Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976) ($350); Morris v. Travisono, 528 F.2d
856 (1st Cir. 1976) ($500); Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974) ($500); Manfredonia
v. Barry, 401 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) ($500); Davidson v. Dixon, 386 F. Supp. 482 (D. Del.
1974) ($500), afldmen, 529 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1975); Antelope v. George, 211 F. Supp. 657 (D.
Idaho 1962) ($500 exemplary or punitive); Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1975)
($1,000), cert. dismissed, 429 U.S. 118 (1976); Campise v. Hamilton, 382 F. Supp. 172 (S.D. Tex.
1974) ($1,500), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102 (1977); Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir.
1972) ($2,000), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973)
($2,500), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974); Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 F. Supp. 585 (D. Minn. 1973)
($2,500); Rhoads v. Horvat, 270 F. Supp. 307 (D. Colo. 1967) ($2,500); Aldridge v. Mullins, 474
F.2d 1189 (6th Cir. 1973) ($3,000); Morris v. Travisono, 528 F.2d 856 (Ist Cir. 1976) ($5,000);
Aumiller v. University of Delaware, 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977) ($5,000); Silver v. Cormier,
529 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1976) ($5,500); Fiedler v. Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1979) ($9,000);
Vetters v. Berry, 575 F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1978) ($10,000); Guzman v. Western State Bank, 540 F.2d
948 (8th Cir. 1976) ($10,000); Cordeco Dev. Corp. v. Santiago Vasquez, 539 F.2d 256 (Ist Cir.
1976) ($15,000), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978 (1976); Palmer v. Hall, 517 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1975)
($15,000); Fiedler v. Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1979) ($20,000); Vetters v. Berry, 575 F.2d
90 (6th Cir. 1978) ($25,000); Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978) ($60,000); Harris v.
Harvey, 605 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979) ($200,000).
275. Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974) ($250).
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that the awards normally do not exceed $10,000, and often consist of
much smaller sums. 276 Punitive damages also are more apt to serve as
an effective deterrent against public officials, who are capable of recur-
rent constitutional violations by reason of their office, than against pri-
vate citizens, who usually commit only isolated tortious acts. The
deterrent effect is enhanced by the fact that public officials are em-
ployed by governmental entities which have an institutional incentive
to discourage recurring constitutional violations.277
Another argument against allowing punitive damages is that the
awards will deter public officials not only from committing constitu-
tional violations, but also from holding public office. This danger is
more apparent than real, however, because the public official immunity
doctrine provides substantial protection against the imposition of dam-
ages for good faith violations of the Constitution.278 Even greater pro-
tection could be provided by conditioning the recovery of punitive
damages upon proof of a more culpable state of mind than the objec-
tive bad faith standard which disqualifies a public official from invok-
ing the immunity doctrine.2 79
With respect to the punishment function, Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 to suppress the organized violence of the Ku
Klux Klan,280 and included criminal as well as civil sanctions in the
statutory scheme.281 An award of punitive damages under section 1983
would complement the objectives of its criminal counterpart.282 Since
Bivens litigation has no criminal analogue, it is less apparent that pun-
ishment is an object of such actions. Yet the lack of a parallel criminal
statute actually constitutes a justification for the award of punitive
damages. In the absence of criminal sanctions, punitive damages are
the most effective means of punishing federal officials who have vio-
lated citizens' constitutional rights.283
276. See generally Annot., 14 A.L.R. Fed. 608 (1973) (punitive damages in actions for viola-
tions of federal civil rights acts).
277. For a summary of the argument that punitive damages have their greatest deterrent ef-
fect when they are levied against "going concerns with continuing institutional motivations to
respond," see D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.9.
278. See text accompanying notes 85-100 supra.
279. See text accompanying notes 307-22 infra.
280. Developments, supra note 67, at 1154. See text accompanying notes 173-76 su ra.
281. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242 (1976).
282. Id. § 242.
283. Most courts that have considered the question have allowed punitive damages in Bivens
actions. See note 264 supra. The cases decided by the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia are in conflict, however. See Payne v. Government of Dist. of Columbia, 559 F.2d 809, 827
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (concurring opinion) (summarizing conflicting cases). The argument against pu-
nitive damages is summarized in the following passage:
[Plunitive damages are unnecessary to the vindication of constitutional interests because
theirjustificatory functions of deterrence and punishment might just as well be served by
1276 [Vol. 67:1242
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Although the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976284
will provide some incentive for constitutional tort plaintiffs to act as
private attorneys general,285 there is no comparable statute authorizing
Bivens plaintiffs to recover fees.286 Furthermore, the typical constitu-
tional tort victim will often be unwilling to sue for nominal damages
and attorney's fees.28 7 Therefore, the possibility of recovering punitive
damages in aggravated cases would create an additional incentive to
bring suit, thereby fulfilling the law enforcement function of punitive
damages.
When the defendant is a public official, an award of punitive dam-
ages would thus serve all three of the remedy's traditional functions.
When the defendant is a governmental entity, however, a different re-
sponse is required.288 The Federal Tort Claims Act, which expressly
disallows punitive damages awards against the United States,28 9 fore-
closes the issue in Bivens litigation. The Act reflects the prevailing phi-
losophy that it is inappropriate to award punitive damages against
governmental entities because they would "ultimately fall upon inno-
cent citizens, whose taxes would be raised, or whose services would be
cut back. 290
The same policy might prompt the United States Supreme Court
to insulate local governmental entities now subject to suit under section
1983291 from liability for punitive damages. But there are important
differences between section 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act
which suggest that punitive damages should be recoverable against lo-
cal governmental entities. First, the language of section 1983 makes no
distinction between the remedies available aginst individual and gov-
ernmental defendants.292 Second, the liability imposed by section 1983
is direct,293 while the liability imposed by the Federal Tort Claims Act
may be vicarious.294 Holding an active tortfeasor liable for punitive
according the victims of constitutional violations compensatory damages,. .. especially
where the lack of clear standards in setting compensation in any given case may permit
amplification of an award on exemplary grounds anyway.
Id. at 827-28. This passage was written prior to Carey. After Carey it is unlikely that a judge
would characterize compensatory damages as having an exemplary component.
284. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), refproducedat note 135 supra.
285. See text accompanying notes 135-36 supra.
286. The pending legislation that would authorize Bivens actions against the United States
provides for the award of "a reasonable attorney's fee." S. 2117, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1977).
287. See text accompanying notes 135-36 supra.
288. D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.9.
289. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
290. D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.9.
291. See text accompanying notes 101-07 supra. States are protected from suit by the elev-
enth amendment. See text accompanying notes 111-12 supra.
292. The text of § 1983 is set forth in note 2 supra.
293. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
294. See text accompanying notes 113-17 supra.
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damages poses far fewer problems than assessing punitive damages
against an innocent defendant. 295 Finally, section 1983 is limited to
constitutional torts,296 while the Federal Tort Claims Act is applicable
to all types of official misconduct, ranging from automobile accidents
to constitutional deprivations.297
B. Rules Governing Recovery of Punitive Damages
Should the Court decide to allow punitive damages, it will have to
resolve two important questions controlling their recovery. First, it will
need to determine whether compensatory damages must be awarded
before punitive damages are recoverable. Second, it will have to spec-
ify the mental state required to justify an award of punitive damages.
1. Foundation for Punitive Damages
Under federal common law, punitive damages are recoverable
upon proof that the plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages.2 98 Several
state courts, however, have ruled that an award of compensatory dam-
ages is a prerequisite to the recovery of punitive damages.299 Presuma-
bly, the purpose of the rule is to restrict the number of cases in which
punitive damages can be awarded."° Yet there is no correlation be-
tween the punitive and deterrent functions of punitive damages and the
proof required to substantiate an award of compensatory damages. As
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed:
[T]here is neither sense nor reason in the proposition that [punitive]
damages may be recovered by a plaintiff who is able to show that he
has lost $10, and may not be recovered by some other plaintiff who has
sustained, it may be, far greater injury, but is unable to prove that he is
poorer in pocket by the wrongdoing of defendant.301
A decision by the Court to allow punitive damages should not be
undermined by predicating the recovery of punitive damages upon
prior allowance of compensatory damages. Federal common law, al-
lowing punitive damages upon proof that the plaintiff is entitled to
295. For a discussion of the law governing the assessment of punitive damages against a vi-
cariously liable defendant, see D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.9.
296. See note 2 supra.
297. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
298. See, e.g., Silver v. Cormier, 529 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1976); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d
862 (3d Cir. 1975). The same rule governs the recovery of punitive damages in dignitary tort
actions. C. McCoRMicK, supra note 15, § 83.
299. See D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.9.
300. For a discussion of the rule, see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 83.
301. Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 88 (3d Cir. 1965) (allowing recovery of punitive damages
based solely upon an award of'nominal damages in a § 1983 action).
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nominal damages,3"2 should apply. The adoption of such a rule would
enhance both the deterrent and the vindicatory effects of punitive dam-
ages in constitutional tort litigation.
30 3
2. The Requisite Mental State
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the mental state
required for an award of punitive damages, the Court in dictum has
offered two different standards. In Carey, Justice Powell noted that
there was "no basis" for a punitive damages award because the defen-
dant had not acted with a "malicious intention" to deprive the plaintiffs
of their rights.3°  In Adickes v. Kress & Co. ,305 on the other hand, Jus-
tice Brennan said in a concurring opinion that punitive damages should
be recoverable under section 1983 whenever the defendant "acted with
actual knowledge that he was violating a [constitutional] right" or with
"reckless disregard of whether he was violating such a right. 30 6
Selection of an appropriate standard for the recovery of punitive
damages must accommodate the fact that a defendant in a constitu-
tional tort action usually will assert a qualified immunity.307 To defeat
this immunity, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted in at
least "objective bad faith." 30 A few lower courts have ruled that the
standard for recovering punitive damages is coterminous with the "ob-
jective bad faith" test,30 9 which gives punitive damages their maximum
deterrent impact by exposing any official who is not immune from suit
to punitive damages liability.310 Most courts, however, have held that
"objective bad faith" is an inappropriate standard for punitive dam-
ages31 because it is essentially a negligence standard.312 Punitive dam-
302. For citations to lower federal court cases that have applied the federal common law in
constitutional tort actions, see notes 298, 301 supra.
303. Some jurisdictions require proof of a reasonable relationship between the amounts of the
punitive and compensatory damages awards. D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.9. The rule has no
relevance, however, when punitive damages are recoverable without proof of actual loss, as under
the federal common law.
304. 435 U.S. at 257 n.ll.
305. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
306. Id. at 233.
307. See text accompanying notes 85-100 supra.
308. See text accompanying notes 93-96 supra.
309. See, e.g., Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475, 482 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
955 (1973).
310. A few courts have suggested that they might be willing to award punitive damages when-
ever they would serve a deterrent function. Keker v. Procunier, 398 F. Supp. 756, 768 (E.D. Cal.
1975) (dictum); Walker v. Fox, 395 F. Supp. 1303, 1306 (S.D. Ohio 1975) ("where the conduct is
found to be willful or wanton or where a deterrent effect will be accomplished").
311. Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 121 (1st Cir. 1977). See Aumiller v.
University of Delaware, 434 F. Supp. 1273, 1311 (D. Del. 1977); United States ex rel Motley v.
Rundle, 340 F. Supp. 807, 811 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
312. See text accompanying notes 93-96 supra.
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ages are not imposed for acts of negligence at common law, 31 3 and
likewise should not be assessed against section 1983 and Bivens defen-
dants who have merely acted in negligent disregard of the plaintiff's
constitutional rights.314
At the other end of the spectrum, some lower courts have ruled
that punitive damages are recoverable only if the defendant "mali-
ciously" or "oppressively" violated the plaintiff's rights.3 5 This stan-
dard is very close to the "subjective bad faith" standard3 6 articulated
by Justice Powell in the Carey dictum. 7 Adoption of the "malicious"
or "subjective bad faith" standard would allay the concerns of those
who fear that punitive damages may constitute an excessively effective
deterrent. On the other hand, requiring proof that the defendant
knowingly violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights would severely
restrict the availability of punitive damages in section 1983 and Bipens
actions.31 9
The alternative, compromise standard is the "reckless disregard"
test advocated by Justice Brennan in Adickes.320 This test is recognized
by both the majority of jurisdictions in common law actions 321 and the
majority of lower federal courts in section 1983 and Bivens actions.322
313. See D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.9.
314. Because punitive damages are traditionally awarded only upon proof of malice or aggra-
vated misconduct, they are often deemed to be uninsurable. D. DoBas, supra note 14, § 3.9; Bur-
rell & Young, Insurability of Punitive Damages, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 1 (1978); Comment, Insurance
for Punitive Damages: A Reevaluation, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (1976).
315. Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393, 398 (6th Cir. 1975) ("willful and malicious"); Skinner
v. Spellman, 480 F.2d 539, 540 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) ("malice"). See Vetters v. Berry, 575
F.2d 90, 96 (6th Cir. 1978) ("malicious and wanton disregard"); Gill v. Manuel, 488 F.2d 799, 801
(7th Cir. 1973) ("willful and malicious").
A few courts have taken the position that punitive damages are appropriate only if there has
been a "constant pattern or practice of behavior" by the defendant and the practice has been
"willful and in gross disregard" for the rights of the plaintiff. Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F. Supp.
161, 170 (D.N.J. 1971), af'dmem., 481 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1973). Accord, Sostre v. McGinnis, 442
F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
316. See, e.g., Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 121 (1st Cir. 1977).
317. See text accompanying note 304 supra.
318. See text accompanying notes 278-79 supra.
319. For a discussion of the proof required to satisfy the subjective bad faith standard, see C.
RHYNE, TORT LIABILITY AND IMMUNITY OF MUNICIPAL OFFICERS 137-45 (1976); Freed, supra
note 81, at 552-64; Kattan, supra note 81, at 968-70, 976-86.
320. See text accompanying note 306 supra.
321. D. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 3.9.
322. Cochetti v. Desmond, 572 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1978) ("acted with actual knowledge
that he was violating a federally protected right or with reckless disregard of whether he was doing
so"); Simpson v. Weeks, 570 F.2d 240, 243 (8th Cir. 1978) ("willfully and in gross disregard for the
[plaintiff's] rights"), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 3101 (1979); Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159, 164 (5th Cir.
1977) ("willfully and with gross disregard for the plaintiff's rights"); Silver v. Cormier, 529 F.2d
161, 163 (10th Cir. 1976) ("reckless indifference to the property rights of others, ill will, a desire to
injure or malice"); Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799, 801 (1st Cir. 1968) (per curiam) ("outra-
geous invasion of plaintifi's privacy"), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
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Under this standard, punitive damages would be imposed not only
against those defendants who acted in subjective bad faith, but also
against those who acted in aggravated objective bad faith. This is the
preferable standard because it maximizes the deterrent impact of puni-
tive damages awards in constitutional tort litigation without departing
from established common law principles.
VI
CONSTITUTIONAL TORT DAMAGES AFTER CAREY:
SECURING THE INHERENT VALUE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Although the Supreme Court limited Carey's scope to section 1983
actions involving procedural due process violations, the opinion sup-
ports certain predictions about the types of damages generally award-
able in constitutional tort actions. Specifically, it appears that a
successful plaintiff will be entitled to recover nominal and proven com-
pensatory damages.3 1 It is less clear whether and when punitive dam-
ages will be available.324 Perhaps the most important unresolved issue
is whether the Court's denial of presumed general damages will extend
beyond the peculiar context of a procedural due process violation.325
The resolution of that question should depend on the extent to which
the types of damages that now appear to be recoverable promote the
compensatory, vindicatory, deterrent, and "bounty" purposes served by
presumed general damages.326
Nominal damages are designed primarily to declare the violation
of a right.327 While declaration may at times advance the objective of
vindication, an award of one dollar is so insubstantial that nominal
damages will more often have the symbolic effect of diminishing the
legitimacy of the plaintiff's complaint. Thus, nominal damages are
often not as effective as presumed general damages in vindicating the
infringement of constitutional rights.
Proven compensatory damages adequately compensate a plaintiff
for losses that are provable with reasonable certainty.328 The spate of
small judgments entered by lower federal courts in actions involving
primarily intangible losses demonstrates, however, that proven dam-
323. See Parts IIIB and IV supra.
324. See Part V supra.
325. See Part IIIA supra.
326. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
327. See Part IV supra.
328. See, e.g., Taken Alive v. Litzau, 551 F.2d 196 (8th Cir. 1977) ($10,000 for personal in-
jury); Scott v. Vandiver, 476 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1973) ($22,993 for personal injury); Roberts v.
Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1971) ($85,000 for personal injury), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866
(1972). See also Part IIIB supra.
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ages do not always effectuate full compensation. 29 A lenient standard
of proof would alleviate this problem,33 0 but only presumed general
damages will ensure adequate compensation for the infringement of
constitutionally protected intangible interests.3 3 1
Generally speaking, proven compensatory damages provide
neither a significant deterrent against the violation of such constitu-
tional rights as due process and privacy nor an effective incentive for
their enforcement.33 2 In order to secure these objectives, the common
law courts have traditionally awarded punitive damages. But even as-
suming that a court may award punitive damages in a constitutional
tort action, 33 there are several doctrinal and practical limitations on
theh effectiveness. First, proof of aggravated misconduct on the de-
fendant's part is necessary to support an award of punitive damages.3 34
Thus, in the ordinary case, punitive damages are unavailable to accom-
plish the deterrent and bounty objectives. Second, while it may be
commonly assumed that awards of punitive damages result in substan-
tial recoveries, this has not been true in section 1983 and Bivens litiga-
tion. Federal court decisions indicate that punitive damage awards
rarely exceed $3,00.33s Third, since a governmental entity is typically
immune from liability for punitive damages, 336 such awards cannot be
used to promote institutional vigilance in protecting citizens' constitu-
tional rights. Finally, judgments for punitive damages may be difficult
to collect because insurance3 37 and statutory indemnity33 8 are generally
unavailable to shift the burden of satisfying such judgments from the
individual defendant. Rules denying a wrongdoer this form of assist-
ance maximize the punitive and deterrent impact of such judgments at
the expense, however, of the vindicatory and bounty objectives of the
remedy.
In light of these shortcomings of nominal, proven compensatory,
and punitive damages, presumed general damages emerge as an impor-
tant remedial device in constitutional tort litigation. An award of pre-
329. See, e.g., Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976) ($350 for unreasonable use of
force in making arrest); Johnson v. Anderson, 420 F. Supp. 845 (D. Del. 1976) ($300 for denial of
procedural due process); Tatum v. Morton, 386 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1974) ($100 for unlawful
arrest).
330. See text accompanying notes 225-36 supra.
331. See Part IiA supra.
332. See Part III supra.
333. See text accompanying notes 263-67 supra.
334. See text accompanying notes 304-22 supra.
335. See text accompanying notes 274-76 supra.
336. See text accompanying notes 288-97 supra.
337. See note 314 supra.
338. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 825 (West Supp. 1979) (providing indemnification for
compensatory but not punitive damages).
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sumed general damages provides effective vindication and adequate
compensation for the infringement of all constitutionally protected in-
terests, including those losses not readily subject to evidentiary proof.
Since punitive damages are generally unavailable, presumed damages
also provide a more effective means of deterring official misconduct
and ensuring that the plaintiff will bring suit in the first instance.
Presumed general damages would not displace proven compensa-
tory and punitive damages in section 1983 and Bivens actions. The
courts should continue to employ these remedies in combination with
presumed general damages in order to provide full relief in all cases. If
common law precedents are followed, 339 double recovery can be
avoided by limiting presumed damages to nonpersonal, intangible
losses. 340 The courts that have allowed presumed damages in constitu-
tional tort actions have properly restricted their coverage to the inher-
ent loss caused, for example, by procedural due process, 341 voting
rights,342 equal protection,343 and first amendment violations. 344 If the
scope of presumed damages is so restricted, proven compensatory dam-
339. See text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
340. The distinction is drawn between intangible losses for personal, nonphysical harm and
intangible losses to dignitary interests. See text accompanying notes 17-21 supra. When an action
is brought under the due process clause for the infliction of emotional distress, for example, it may
not be necessary to presume compensatory damages. See, e.g., White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381
(7th Cir. 1979). At common law, the accepted remedy in an action for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress is proven compensatory damages. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46,
Comment j (1965).
A few courts have presumed damages for both the loss of civil rights and mental anguish.
See, eg., Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1971) (housing discrimination).
A presumption of damages for personal, nonphysical harm should be rebuttable, as it is in defa-
mation actions. D. DOaBS, supra note 14, § 7.2.
341. Unified School Dist. No. 480 v. Epperson, 551 F.2d 254 (10th Cir. 1977); Hostrop v.
Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975); Bruce v. Board of Regents,
414 F. Supp. 559, 569 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
342. Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64, 66 (8th Cir. 1919) (plaintiff barred from polling booth;
awarded $2,000 in general damages):
In the eyes of the law this right is so valuable that damages are presumed from the
wrongful deprivation of it without evidence of actual loss of money, property, or any
other valuable thing, and the amount of the damages is a question peculiarly appropriate
for the determination of the jury, because each member of the jury has personal knowl-
edge of the value of the right.
In Carey, the Court observed that it had allowed damage actions to be maintained for wrong-
ful deprivations of voting rights, but that it had 'not considered the prerequisites for recovery."
435 U.S. at 265 n.22. The Court cited Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), its leading decision
on the subject, and Ashby v. White, 1 Eng. Rep. 417 (H.L. 1703). In Ashby, the House of Lords
affirmed an award of five pounds to an alleged pauper who had been denied the right to vote for
an alleged failure to pay taxes. Since the plaintiff was awarded substantial compensatory damages
without proof of actual loss, the verdict sanctioned general damages. Thus, it is significant that in
Carey the Court noted that "[t]he common-law rule of damages for wrongful deprivations of
voting rights embodied in Ashby v. White would, of course, be quite relevant to the analogous
question under § 1983." 435 U.S. at 265 n.22. It should also be noted that, in Wiley v. Sinkler,
179 U.S. 58 (1900), the Court held that a complaint alleging $2,500 in damages for the deprivation
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ages for humiliation and mental anguish should be liberally allowed in
situations where the plaintiff has offered some proof of such injury 3 45
There are a number of ways in which the amount of a presumed
general damages award could be established. At common law the trier
of fact determines the amount, subject to the general guideline that the
award should be "neither so small as to trivialize the right nor so large
as to provide a windfall. '3 46 Although the courts might control this
discretion by placing a ceiling on the recoverable amount,347 the impo-
sition of arbitrary cutoff points would be more appropriate in a legisla-
tive response to this issue.
Congress could authorize recovery of a liquidated sum, 348 guaran-
tee recovery of a minimum amount, or grant the trier of fact discretion
to allow recovery within a specified range. Ample precedent for such
legislation may be found in the federal and state civil rights statutes
that have been enacted since 1871. In 1968, for example, Congress en-
acted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,3 49 which pro-
vides that any victim of an illegal wiretap may recover "actual damages
but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a
of voting rights without alleging any actual losses satisfied the jurisdictional amount requirement
of $2,000.
343. Hodge v. Seiler, 558 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1977) (§ 1982 action for housing discrimination);
McNeil v. P-N-S, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 658 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (§ 1982 action for housing discrimina-
tion).
In Hodge v. Seiler, the plaintiffs claim for damages was dismissed by the trial court for
failure to prove actual losses after she testified that "she was not upset when she learned of the
defendants' discriminatory motive in refusing her housing because she was aware at that time that
she had a legal remedy." 558 F.2d at 287. The court of appeals reversed, citing the voting rights
cases and holding that damages could be presumed from the denial of the constitutional right. Id.
at 287-88.
344. Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Thonen v. Jenkins, 374 F. Supp. 134
(E.D.N.C. 1974); Endress v. Brookdale Community College, 144 N.J. Super. 109, 127, 364 A.2d
1080, 1098 (1976).
345. See text accompanying notes 212-24 supra.
346. See, e.g., Piphus v. Carey, 545 F.2d 30, 32 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
347. There is precedent for judicially limiting the amount of damages recoverable in a tort
action. In England, where the courts allow recovery for the loss of expectation of life, they have
limited the amount recoverable to a relatively small sum, occasionally increasing the award to
take inflation into account. P. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 83-84 (2d ed.
1975). The first case placing such a limit on this type of damage allowed for the recovery of up to
£200. Benham v. Gambling, [1941] A.C. 157. Later cases raised the amount to £500, and then to
£750. See H. West & Son, Ltd. v. Shephard, [1964] A.C. 326, 361-63 (dissenting opinion) (urging
extension of Benham to other types of intangible losses). For a description of the Australian cases
imposing a similar ceiling, see H. LUNTZ, ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND
DEATH 103-06 (1974).
348. For example, the proposed amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act would allow
recovery in a Bivens action of no "less than liquidated damages of $1,000." S. 2117, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 3 (1977).
349. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-350, 82 Stat. 197
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976)).
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day for each day of violation, or $1,000, whichever is higher."350 Simi-
larly, a Massachusetts statute which prohibits discrimination in any
place of public accommodation provides that a violator shall pay "to
any person aggrieved thereby not less than one hundred nor more than
five hundred dollars."'351 Regardless of the exact limits that might be
chosen, the amount of any statutory recovery should be sufficient to
ensure the fulfillment of the remedial objectives of compensation, vin-
dication, deterrence, and law enforcement.
CONCLUSION
Despite the dramatic increase in constitutional litigation during
the preceding two decades, the United States Supreme Court did not
consider the appropriate nature of legal relief in such actions until
1978. In that year, the Court in Carey v. P'phus articulated the general
proposition that constitutional tort damages should be fashioned by
reference to common law damages. The Court cautioned, however,
that if the interests protected by a particular constitutional right were
not directly analogous to the interests protected by common law dam-
ages, the common law rule should be tailored to fit the constitutional
right in question. Unfortunately, the Court failed to heed its own ad-
vice. Although it allowed the recovery of nominal and proven compen-
satory damages for a procedural due process deprivation, the Court
refused to recognize presumed general damages for the loss of the in-
herent value of the constitutional right. As a result, there is no fully
effective remedy in the aftermath of Carey to vindicate and compensate
procedural due process infringements.
This Article has recommended that Carey be confined to proce-
dural due process deprivations. It has advocated the judicial or legisla-
tive recognition of presumed general damages for the infringement of
other constitutional rights. It has also proposed the adoption of rules to
facilitate the recovery of proven compensatory damages for intangible
losses and the recognition of punitive damages in constitutional litiga-
tion. The adoption of these recommendations would enhance the ca-
pacity of section 1983 and Bivens damages to perform the traditional
functions of legal relief.
350. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1976).
351. MASS. GEN. LAWS AN. ch. 272, § 98 (West Supp. 1978). See also N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
LAW § 41 (McKinney 1976).
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